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The ease with which digital data can be duplicated and distributed over the
media and the Internet has raised many concerns about copyright infringement.
In many situations, multimedia data (e.g., images, music, movies, etc) are illegally
circulated, thus violating intellectual property rights. In an attempt to overcome
this problem, watermarking has been suggested in the literature as the most ef-
fective means for copyright protection and authentication. Watermarking is the
procedure whereby information (pertaining to owner and/or copyright) is embed-
ded into host data, such that it is: (i) hidden, i.e., not perceptually visible; and (ii)
recoverable, even after a (possibly malicious) degradation of the protected work.
In this thesis, we prove some theoretical results that establish the fundamental
limits of a general class of watermarking schemes.
The main focus of this thesis is the problem of joint watermarking and com-
pression of images, which can be briefly described as follows: due to bandwidth
or storage constraints, a watermarked image is distributed in quantized form, us-
ing RQ bits per image dimension, and is subject to some additional degradation
(possibly due to malicious attacks). The hidden message carries RW bits per
image dimension. Our main result is the determination of the region of allow-
able rates (RQ, RW ), such that: (i) an average distortion constraint between the
original and the watermarked/compressed image is satisfied, and (ii) the hidden
message is detected from the degraded image with very high probability. Using
notions from information theory, we prove coding theorems that establish the rate
region in the following cases: (a) general i.i.d. image distributions, distortion
constraints and memoryless attacks, (b) memoryless attacks combined with collu-
sion (for fingerprinting applications), and (c) general—not necessarily stationary
or ergodic—Gaussian image distributions and attacks, and average quadratic dis-
tortion constraints. Moreover, we prove a multi-user version of a result by Costa
on the capacity of a Gaussian channel with known interference at the encoder.
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Over the last decade, principally due to the development of the Internet and the
World-Wide-Web (WWW), distribution of digital multimedia data to a large pop-
ulation of users can be done very easily. Moreover, digital data can be duplicated
very fast and without any degradation in quality—consider, for example, how
common the copying of musical CDs has become in the last few years. Naturally,
this situation has raised many concerns about possible violations of intellectual
property rights. Unauthorized duplication and distribution of copyrighted ma-
terial (photographs, music, movies, etc.), without appropriate compensation to
the copyright holders, are becoming increasingly problematic. In order to fight
piracy, many companies (especially in the entertainment and news industries) have
devoted considerable attention to the development of information hiding (or wa-
termarking) techniques. In plain terms, a watermark is a signal which is hidden
(i.e., is not perceptually visible) inside some multimedia data, and carries informa-
tion about this data (e.g., owner, title, date of creation, etc). Thus a watermark
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uniquely identifies the work being protected, and helps resolve disputes about the
ownership of the data.
As an example of the usefulness of watermarking, let us consider a simple sce-
nario: Newspaper X publishes a photograph, for which it claims exclusive rights.
Newspaper Y, also claiming to be the exclusive owner, publishes the same pho-
tograph after copying it from X. Without any special protection mechanism, X
cannot prove that it is the rightful owner of the photograph. However, if X wa-
termarks the photograph before publication (that is, X embeds a hidden message
that identifies it as its legitimate owner), and is able to detect the watermark later
in the illegally distributed copy, it will be able to supply proof of ownership in a
court of law. On the other hand, to prevent detection of the watermark, Y may try
to remove it from the picture by distorting the picture. That is, Y may attempt
to attack the watermark so as to render it undetectable, without significantly de-
grading the quality of the image or affecting its commercial value. Careful design
of the watermarking system can prevent this from happening.
There have been many instances of disputes or litigations on the intellectual
ownership of multimedia data. A copyright violations lawsuit that received ex-
tensive publicity in the early 2000’s, was that against Napster [1]. Napster was
essentially a centralized database which allowed millions of users to freely dis-
tribute music files in a peer-to-peer network. The music files were unwatermarked
and compressed in such a way that the quality of the reproduced music was very
close to that of a Compact Disc (CD recording). However, all copyright informa-
tion that normally accompanies the music written on a CD was lost. As a result,
it was not an easy task for the music companies to prove that unauthorized distri-
bution was indeed taking place through Napster. A watermarking scheme robust
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to compression would have provided additional ammunition to the music industry,
as the copyright information would have been inseparable from the music itself.
Due to its significance, the watermarking field has grown tremendously over the
last five years. There are numerous articles (e.g., see [2, 3, 4] and the references
therein) and books (e.g., [5, 6]) that explain the basics of watermarking, explore
its many practical applications, and evaluate the performance of various schemes
under a variety of attacks.
Two key issues in the design of watermarking schemes are:
• Transparency: The hidden message should not interfere perceptually with
the host signal (or covertext [7]). This requirement is perfectly justified by
the fact that watermarking aims at protecting multimedia data, which are
sensitive, in general, to changes. In other words, an image or a musical
piece could become useless if the introduced artifacts (due to watermarking)
exceeded some perceptual threshold. The quality of the watermarked data
must thus be comparable to that of the covertext, a requirement which is
often expressed in terms of a distortion constraint.
• Robustness: The message must be detectable in the watermarked image
(the covertext is assumed to be an image throughout this thesis, though sim-
ilar techniques can be applied to other types of multimedia data), even after
degradation due to malicious attacks or other processing (quantization, D/A
conversion, etc). Of course, detectability of the watermark is closely related
to the maximum amount of distortion that can be introduced by an attacker
(for example, an attack that completely destroys an image would render the
watermark detection impossible). A watermarking scheme is robust if it al-
lows the hidden message to be accurately decoded in a distorted image whose
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quality is close to that of the watermarked image (this requirement is again
expressed in terms of a distortion constraint).
There are two detection scenarios: private and public. In the private detection
scenario, the original image is available to the detector; in the public scenario, it
is not. Although public detection schemes can be more useful in practice (since it
is not always possible to have the original image available during the detection),
private schemes usually offer more robustness.
One important application of information hiding is fingerprinting (also known
as transaction tracking [6]). The fingerprint is a signal hidden inside an image,
which satisfies the aforementioned transparency and robustness requirements. As
opposed to a watermark, a fingerprint uniquely identifies each individual copy
distributed, making it possible to trace illegally distributed data back to the user
[8]. In other words, a fingerprint plays the role of a user’s serial number. When
both embedded into an image, watermark and fingerprint uniquely identify an
(owner, user) pair.
Fingerprinting applications create new possibilities for attacks, mainly collusion
attacks. In this type of attack, two or more users who possess fingerprinted copies
of the same image combine their copies to produce a forged document in which the
individual fingerprints maybe harder to detect (than without collusion) [9, 10, 11].
1.2 Literature Review on Information-Theoretic
Aspects of Watermarking
Information hiding has also been studied from an information-theoretic perspec-




















Figure 1.1: Watermarking system viewed as communication system with side in-
formation.
munication process, their main goal being to determine the maximum number of
bits that can be hidden in (and reliably detected from) an image. In general, this
number grows linearly with the image size, and the constant of proportionality is
known as the capacity C. Practical watermarking implementations embed at a
rate R bits/image dimension, where R < C.
1.2.1 Communication with Side Information
In the communication model for watermarking, the watermark embedder plays the
role of the transmitter, the watermark detector plays the role of the receiver and
the attack represents the communication channel (see Figure 1.1). The objective
is to decode the hidden message reliably; the original image can be construed of
as side information which is always available at the encoder, but is only available
at the decoder in the private scenario (not the public one) [12, 4, 6].
Earlier results on communication with side information at the transmitter (such
as those obtained by Gel’fand and Pinsker [13], Heegard and El Gamal [14] and
Costa [15]) have been applied extensively to digital watermarking in the public
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scenario. Costa’s paper [15] in particular, has been instrumental in the develop-
ment of many practical watermarking schemes [16, 6, 17]. Specifically, the author
considers the following situation: a transmitter sends a signal Xn to a receiver
(with n transmissions), through the following channel:
Y n = Xn + Sn + Zn
where Sn, Zn are independent, i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors. Here, Sn is known
to the encoder (but not the decoder), while Zn acts as noise known to neither
encoder or decoder. It is proved that the capacity of this channel is the same as if
Sn were known to the decoder as well. Namely, C = 1/2 log(1 + P/N), where P is
the average (per symbol) power of Xn and N is average power of Zn. This result is
quite surprising because one would expect Sn to act as interference at the receiver,
thus hindering the detection of the message. The analogy to watermarking is
obvious: in a public detection scenario, Sn would play the role of the covertext
(known to the watermark embedder only), Xn would represent the watermark
embedded, and Zn would be the noise added by the attacker. Extensions of this
result are developed by Yu et al. [18] and Cohen and Lapidoth [19].
1.2.2 Capacity of Watermarking Systems without Com-
pression
One of the earliest information-theoretic studies of watermarking is by Moulin,
O’Sullivan and Ettinger [20]. Extensions of that work are published in [21, 22, 9]
by the first two authors. The main problem they consider is the following: a
watermarker (or information hider) embeds a watermark into an image such that
an average distortion constraint is met. An attacker modifies the watermarked
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image using a memoryless attack to produce a forgery. The attacker is also limited
by a distortion constraint, expressible either between the watermarked image and
the forgery, or the original image and the forgery. Note that although the attacker
does not have the original image in his possession, an average distortion constraint
between the original image and the forgery can still be satisfied. The detector
attempts to detect the watermark message from the forgery, possibly with the aid
of some side information (e.g., the original image in a private scenario). Through
a coding theorem, the authors compute the maximum achievable rate of the size
of the watermark message set. They show that this maximum rate (i.e., capacity)
is the value of a game played by the information hider and the attacker. In this
game, the watermarker chooses his watermarking scheme so as to maximize the
embedding rate while the attacker chooses an attack mechanism so as to minimize
it. It is also assumed that the attacker knows the covert channel utilized by the
watermarker, while the decoder knows the attack channel transition probabilities
(more details about these assumptions will be given in Chapter 2). The authors
also compute the capacity for the case where the covertext is i.i.d. Gaussian
distributed, and show that the capacity remains the same in both the public and
the private scenarios.
Another interesting information-theoretic treatment of digital watermarking is
due to Cohen and Lapidoth [23, 7, 24]. In their work, they determine the capacity
of a watermarking system, similar to the one considered by Moulin and O’Sullivan
above, but with the following differences: (a) the attacker is not constrained to
perform a memoryless attack; (b) the distortion constraints on the watermarker
and the attacker are of the almost sure, rather than average, type; (c) neither
encoder or decoder have any knowledge about the attack channel other than the
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aforementioned distortion constraints; and (d) the attacker knows the details of the
watermark embedder except for a secret key shared between encoder and decoder.
In order to prove their result, the authors determine the value of the “mutual
information game”, which is the same as the value of the memoryless attack game
(with average quadratic distortion constraints) that is studied in [9]. Moreover,
the authors prove that, under average quadratic distortion constraints, there exists
a (non-memoryless) attack that results in zero capacity.
A similar formulation for a vector Gaussian watermarking game is proposed by
Cohen and Lapidoth in [7] and studied in detail in [25].
The capacity of a private watermarking scheme is studied by Somekh-Baruch
and Merhav in [26, 27]. Here, the distortion constraint is expressed as follows:
the probability that the distortion induced (by the watermarker or the attacker)
exceeds a given threshold is upper bounded by an exponentially decaying func-
tion. This requirement (termed “large deviations distortion constraint”) is more
general than the almost sure constraint considered by Cohen [24]. In addition to
determining the capacity, the authors investigate the exponent of the probability
of decoding error; similar studies are conducted in [28]. Finally, the capacity of a
public watermarking scheme is investigated in [29].
Steinberg and Merhav [30] study the identification capacity of a watermarking
system, subject to a memoryless attack channel. For that model, they derive the
maximum number of watermarks that can be embedded into an image, assuming
that the decoder is interested only in determining (with vanishing probability of
error) whether a particular watermark in present in the watermarked image or not.
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1.2.3 Joint Watermarking and Compression
The problem of joint watermarking and compression of images—which is the main
focus of this thesis—has received less attention in the literature. This problem
can be formally described as follows: due to bandwidth or storage constraints, a
watermarked image is quantized to RQ bits per image dimension, corresponding
to a source codebook index. The information is then delivered to the customer,
who is assumed to have access to the source codebook. The compression scheme
complies with the aforementioned transparency and robustness requirements, in
that a distortion (fidelity) constraint is met, and the watermark is detectable from
the reproduced (quantized), and possibly degraded, version of the image.
In [16], Chen and Wornell develop an interesting watermarking/compression
scheme termed Quantization Index Modulation (QIM), where an ensemble of
quantizers—each corresponding to a particular watermark index—is used for com-
pressing the image. The authors provide an information-theoretic analysis of QIM
based on Costa’s work [15], and developed a practical scheme which makes use
of dithered quantizers. Also, they distinguish between two versions of QIM: reg-
ular and distortion-compensated QIM. In regular QIM, the watermarked image is
communicated to the user as an index in a source codebook, while in distortion-
compensated QIM, the output of the encoder is a linear combination of the cover-
text and the output of a quantizer. Regular QIM is of relevance to our work and
will be studied further in Chapter 2.
The main goal of this thesis is the determination of regions of allowable rates
(RQ, RW ), where RW is the rate of the watermark index set, under certain trans-
parency and robustness requirements. In [31, 8], Karakos and Papamarcou examine
the case where the watermarked/compressed image is not subject to attacks (com-
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pression inherently introduces degradation, but cannot be construed as a malicious
attack of the type studied in, e.g., [9, 24]). They show that, when the original im-
age is i.i.d. Gaussian and an average quadratic distortion constraint is imposed,















where PI is the image variance (per dimension or pixel) and D is the average
quadratic distortion between the original image and the watermarked/compressed
image. In this thesis, we extend this result to the case where the quantized,
watermarked image is subject to malicious attacks, as well as to the case where
fingerprinted images are distributed to different customers and are subject to collu-
sion attacks. More details about these extensions can be found in the next section,
where an overview of the thesis is presented.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we establish the rate region of
achievable rate pairs (RQ, RW ) under memoryless attacks such that (i) an average
quadratic constraint between the original image and the watermarked, compressed
image is satisfied, and (ii) the probability of correct detection of the watermark
from a distorted image approaches unity as the number of image dimensions ap-
proaches infinity. The following cases are considered:
• The memoryless attack is chosen independently of the embedding strategy
and is known to both encoder and decoder. Results are obtained for two
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statistical models: the general discrete alphabet case for arbitrary image dis-
tributions and distortion constraints, as well as the Gaussian case where the
original image and the attack channel are i.i.d. Gaussian, and the distortion
metric is quadratic.
• The information hider and the attacker play a game (similar to [9]). Specif-
ically, the attacker knows the encoding function used by the watermarker,
while the decoder knows the attack distribution.
Moreover, we give achievability results for the rate region of regular QIM (public
scenario), as well as the rate region of additive watermarking schemes [31, 8, 32].
In Chapter 3 we establish the region of achievable rates for fingerprinting sys-
tems under collusion attacks. Similar statistical models (discrete and Gaussian)
are considered here. The formulation is different than the one in Chapter 2, in
that we allow a number of users to collude by producing a forgery which depends
on more than one fingerprinted version of the same image. We demonstrate that
collusion can be very effective in reducing the size of the rate region. We con-
clude Chapter 3 with a multi-user version of Costa’s paper; we prove that in the
public version of a fingerprinting system without compression, the maximum rate
achievable under Gaussian symmetric collusion attacks is the same as in a private
scenario.
In Chapter 4 we extend the theory derived by Yu et al. in [18] for non-stationary
Gaussian models, to the case where watermarked images are quantized before
distribution. We obtain a general rate region formula, and we give examples in
which the general formula yields simpler expressions. Finally, conclusions and
directions for further research are given in Chapter 5.
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1.4 Information-Theoretic Contributions
In this section, we briefly summarize the most important contributions of this
thesis, from an information-theoretic viewpoint.
As mentioned in the previous section, the main problem treated in this thesis
is that of joint quantization and watermarking. Using terminology from commu-
nication theory, this problem can be stated as follows: a transmitter wishes to
convey two kinds of information through a channel: a quantized form of a random
vector (i.e., the image), and a message (the watermark index) taken from a par-
ticular set of messages. Each information is intended for two different “receivers”,
respectively: the watermark index has to be decoded only by one receiver (i.e., the
watermark decoder) and not the other (i.e., the customer), while the quantized in-
formation is decodable by both. Moreover, the customer receives a noise-free copy
of the quantized image, while the watermark decoder has access to side information
(the original image), which is not available to the customer.
A naive way of performing the encoding would be to concatenate the two bit-
streams that describe the two entities (image and watermark) and send the result
through the channel. However, this particular encoding is inefficient in terms of
protection, because an attacker can simply discard the watermark message with-
out affecting the image quality. Instead, our goal is to embed the watermark
information inside the compressed image representation. This is accomplished by
designing appropriate source codewords, which can be used for conveying informa-
tion through an attack channel. In other words, we study to what extent a source
codebook can be used as a channel codebook, and we derive the relationship be-
tween the rates of these two codebooks. This relationship reveals two interesting
(and quite surprising) properties: (i) at low quantization rates, Gaussian attack
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noise does not affect the detectability of the watermark, and the only limitation
imposed on the watermarking rate is due to the quantization itself; and (ii) at high
(but finite) quantization rates the source code can achieve the watermarking rate
of an optimal channel code.
The relationship between quantization and watermarking rates is derived in
Chapter 2 for the single-watermark (or, single user) case. Chapter 3 is an extension
of the result of Chapter 2 to the multi-user case, in which the decoder decodes
reliably more than one (fingerprint) messages. The result derived in this case
is relevant to the expression for the rate region of a multi-access channel [33].
Moreover, we prove that a Gaussian multi-access channel with side information
available only at the transmitter has the same capacity (assuming that the rates
of all users are the same), as if the side information were known at the receiver
as well. This result extends Costa’s single-user result. Finally, it is interesting
that the analysis of Chapter 2 can be extended to the case of non-stationary and
non-ergodic Gaussian images and attacks, as explained in Chapter 4.
1.5 Notation
The following symbols and conventions will be used consistently throughout the
thesis.
Capital letters are used to denote random quantities, while small letters denote
deterministic quantities (or realizations of the respective random variables). Also,
a random variable can be a deterministic function of a random quantity (e.g., Ŷ =
ŷ(Q)). All variables take values in sets that are represented by the corresponding
script letters, e.g., X ∈ X . A sequence of n variables X1, . . . , Xn is denoted by Xn
and belongs to the Cartesian product X n.
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We denote the original image (covertext) by In. The integer n can be inter-
preted in many ways; it could represent the number of pixels of the image or the
number of its most significant DCT coefficients. The exact meaning of n pertains
to the particular implementation of the watermarking algorithm. For the purposes
of this thesis, we assume that n represents the number of image values that are
altered by means of the watermarking algorithm. Moreover, we assume that the
watermark index W is uniformly distributed on the set {1, . . . , 2nRW }, where RW
is the watermarking rate. The watermark decoder, which attempts to detect W
from a watermarked, compressed and possibly distorted image, outputs its esti-
mate Ŵ of W . Finally, a source codebook (quantizer) consists of 2nRQ elements
{ŷn(1), . . . , ŷn(2nRQ)}, where RQ is the quantization rate.
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Chapter 2
Relationship between Quantization and
Watermarking Rates in the Presence of
Memoryless Attacks
In this chapter, we establish the region of achievable rates (RQ, RW ) under mem-
oryless attacks. We assume that a distortion constraint on the watermarker (and,
possibly, on the attacker) is met and the probability of correct watermark detec-
tion goes to unity when n goes to infinity. The chapter is organized as follows: in
Section 2.1 we give a summary of the results; proofs of the theorems can be found
in Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. Finally, we conclude the chapter with Section 2.6,
where we discuss achievable rate regions of various schemes. The results of this
chapter are extensions of results published in [31, 8, 34, 32].
2.1 Summary of Results
This section summarizes the results for: (i) the case in which the memoryless attack
is fixed (in terms of the conditional probability distribution of the attack channel),
for both discrete and continuous alphabets; and (ii) the case where the attacker
15
chooses its distribution with respect to the distribution of Ŷ n given In used by
the watermarker, and with respect to some distortion constraint on the attack. In
the latter case, we assume that the attacker knows the information hiding strategy
utilized by the watermarker, and tries to minimize the achievable rate region by
appropriate choice of the attack (while the watermarker tries to maximize the same
region). Thus, watermarker and attacker play a game, in which the watermarker
plays first (by choosing the information-hiding strategy) and the attacker plays
next by choosing its attack strategy with respect to the strategy chosen by the
watermarker. Note that the watermark encoder knows pZn|Ŷ n = (pZ|Ŷ )
n only in
case (i), while the watermark decoder knows (or can reliably estimate) pZ|Ŷ in both
cases (i) and (ii).
2.1.1 Fixed Attack Channel
We first present results for discrete alphabets, and then for continuous alphabets
with Gaussian distributions.
Discrete Alphabets
The general form of the watermarking/quantization system under consideration
is shown in Figure 2.1. The watermark index W is uniformly distributed over a
set of size 2nRW ; In is the n-dimensional i.i.d. image, with distribution pIn(i
n) =∏n
j=1 pI(ij); and Ŷ
n is the watermarked/quantized image which can be found in a
source codebook of size 2nRQ . The attack channel is memoryless; its conditional

























Figure 2.1: The general watermarking/quantization system with memoryless at-
tacks.
The watermark decoder outputs Ŵ , its estimate of W . We consider a private
scenario here, so we assume that In is known at the decoder. The transparency
and robustness requirements are expressed via the following constraints:
Transparency: n−1Ed(In, Ŷ n) = n−1
n∑
j=1
Ed(Ij, Ŷj) ≤ D (2.1)
Robustness: Pr{Ŵ = W} → 0 as n → ∞ (2.2)
where d : I × Ŷ → R+ is a given distortion function and D is a non-negative
number.
Formally stated, we have the following definition of a private quantization/wa-
termarking code.
Definition 2.1 A (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) private quantization/watermarking code con-
sists of the following:
• A watermark set Mn = {1, . . . , 2nRW }.
• An encoding function f : Mn × In → Ŷn which maps a watermark index w
and an image sequence in to a representation sequence ŷn taken from the set
{ŷn(1), . . . , ŷn(2nRQ)}.
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• A decoding function g : Zn×In → Mn which maps the output of the channel
zn and the original image in to an estimate ŵ of w.
For random W and In, we have the random quantities Ŷ n = f(W, In) and Ŵ =
g(Zn, In). A definition of a public quantization/watermarking code would be sim-
ilar to the above, except that the decoder g would take as input only zn.
We now state the following definitions:
Definition 2.2 The probability of error in detecting watermark w is given by
Pe(w) = Pr{g(Zn, In) = w|Ŷ n = f(w, In)}






and is equal to Pr{W = Ŵ} when the watermark index W is uniformly distributed
in {1, . . . , 2nRW }.
Definition 2.3 For a (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) quantization/watermarking code, the aver-






assuming that W is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2nRW }.
Definition 2.4 A rate pair (RQ, RW ) is achievable for distortion constraint D,
if there exists a sequence of quantization/watermarking codes (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) such
that maxw Pe(w) tends to 0 as n → ∞ and D̄ ≤ D. Moreover, a rate region R of
pairs (RQ, RW ) is achievable if every element of R is achievable.
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Definition 2.5 For a quantization/watermarking system operating at quantiza-
tion rate RQ, the watermarking capacity C(RQ) is defined as the supremum of all
rates RW such that (RQ, RW ) is achievable.
Our first result is stated as follows:
Theorem 2.1 A private quantization/watermarking code (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) satisfies
the transparency and robustness requirements (2.1) and (2.2) respectively, if and
only if (RQ, RW ) ∈ RdscD , where
RdscD =
{
(RQ, RW ) :
RQ ≥ min
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
I(Ŷ ; I)
RW ≤ max
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
}
Here,
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
∆
= min{RQ − I(Ŷ ; I), I(Z; Ŷ |I)} (2.3)
and the mutual information quantities on the right-hand side of (2.3) are com-
puted with respect to pI , pŶ |I and pZ|Ŷ . Theorem 2.1 holds for arbitrary discrete
alphabets In, Ŷn,Zn. The superscript “dsc” in RdscD is used to distinguish this
rate region from the one obtained in the case of continuous alphabets. The proof
of Theorem 2.1 can be found in Section 2.2.
Continuous Alphabets, Gaussian Distributions
A variant of Theorem 2.1 can be obtained in the case of continuous alphabets
(all equal to R). We consider the system shown in Figure 2.2. Here, In is i.i.d.
Gaussian with variance PI ; the memoryless attack is described by the expression
Zn = βAŶ
n + V n where βA is a real scalar and V




















Figure 2.2: The watermarking/quantization system with Gaussian attacks com-
bined with scaling.
PV ; and the distortion function d is the squared difference:
d(x, y) = (x − y)2 (2.4)
The distortion constraint (2.1) then becomes
n−1E||In − Ŷ n||2 ≤ D (2.5)
The rate region RgaussD of achievable rates in the continuous case is then established
by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 A private, continuous alphabet quantization/watermarking code








































































γ(PI + D) − 2PI + 2
√
PI(γD − PI)(γ − 1)
γ2
(2.6)
and [·]+ ∆= max{·, 0}. The proof of the Theorem 2.2 can be found in Section 2.3.
RgaussD is the shaded region in Figure 2.3. Its upper boundary is composed of:





























































, i.e., the projection of BC on the RQ-axis.
• The half-line C∞ which is parallel to the RQ-axis and has vertex C. The







Two key conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2.3:
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, which is the maximum
watermarking rate for the case of no attack (DA=0). In other words, at low
quantization rates, Gaussian attack noise does not degrade the performance
of the system.








, the maximum watermarking rate is








. This expression makes sense in the
case RQ = ∞, where the distortion in the original image is solely due to
watermarking, and where β2AD represents the “signal” power in the AWGN
Gaussian attack channel of variance PV —hence the familiar expression for
the capacity of that channel. It is surprising that in the case RQ < ∞,
there exists a quantization rate threshold above which quantization does not
hinder the detection of the watermark, i.e., the watermarking rate can be as
high as in the case of no compression.
2.1.2 The Watermarker vs. Attacker Game
Here, we assume that the attacker knows (or can estimate reliably) the joint distri-
bution of In, Ŷ n (a similar assumption was made in [9, 22]). Thus, depending on
the encoding algorithm and the rate RQ chosen by the watermarker, the attacker
chooses his conditional distribution function pZ|Ŷ (we use single letters here be-
cause we assume memoryless attacks), so as to minimize the maximum achievable
rate C(RQ), subject to a fidelity criterion. This fidelity criterion can be expressed
in the form of a distortion constraint between the watermarked image Ŷ n and the
forgery Zn. Similarly to the distortion constraint on the watermarker, we assume
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EdA(Ŷj, Zj) ≤ DA (2.7)
for some non-negative DA.
On the other hand, the watermarker (who designs the encoder/decoder pair)
has to ensure that the detection of the watermark is reliable for any attack that
the attacker is allowed to use. So, watermarker and attacker play a game, in which
the former tries to maximize the achievable rate region while the latter tries to
minimize it. Note that we call a rate region maximized, when C(RQ) is maximum
for all RQ (analogously for minimum). The “rules” of this game are expressed as
follows:
• The encoder (watermark embedder) is designed without any knowledge of
the attack conditional distribution pZ|Ŷ . Therefore, in terms of the game
evolution, the watermarker plays first, and designs an encoding function f
(according to Definition 2.1) that remains fixed for the rest of the game. This
function f induces a fixed conditional probability pŶ n|In . Moreover, the rate
pair (RQ, RW ) of the quantization/watermarking code is chosen without any
knowledge of the attack and remains fixed. The watermarker must ensure
that the rates are chosen such that the watermark is detected reliably for
any attack distribution pZ|Ŷ chosen by the attacker.
• The attacker, who knows pŶ n|In , plays second and chooses a conditional
distribution pZ|Ŷ for the attack such that the distortion constraint (2.7) is
met.
• The watermarker plays next, and designs his watermark decoding algorithm
g with respect to the distribution pZ|Ŷ chosen by the attacker.
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Given the above game formulation, we now define an achievable rate pair
(RQ, RW ) as follows:
Definition 2.6 A rate pair (RQ, RW ) is achievable for distortion constraint D if
there exists a sequence of quantization/watermarking codes (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) such
that for any admissible attack distribution pZ|Ŷ , the maximal error probability
maxw Pe(w) tends to 0 as n → ∞ and D̄ ≤ D. Moreover, a rate region R of
pairs (RQ, RW ) is achievable if every element of R is achievable.
For the rest of our results in this sub-section, we assume that Definition 2.6 is in
effect when we refer to achievable rates.
We now define the following sets of distributions, which we use in the sequel:
M(pI , D) ∆= {pŶ n|In : n−1
n∑
j=1
Ed(Ij, Ŷj) ≤ D} (2.8)
Mml(pI , D) ∆= {pŶ |I : Ed(I, Ŷ ) ≤ D} (2.9)
which contains all the memoryless distributions that belong to M(pI , D). Also,




n)j, Zj) ≤ DA} (2.10)
where dA : Ŷ × Z → R+ is a distortion function. Observe that the set
MA(pI , f,DA) depends on f only through the induced conditional probability
pŶ n|In = pf(W,In)|In . Thus, instead of writing the attacker’s set of admissible dis-
tributions as MA(pI , f,DA), we use the notation
MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA) ∆= {pZ|Ŷ : n−1
n∑
j=1
EdA(Ŷj, Zj) ≤ DA} (2.11)
Note that by the Markov condition
In → Ŷ n → Zn (2.12)
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we have pZn,Ŷ n,In = (pZ|Ŷ )
n pŶ n|In (pI)
n.
The admissible set of distributions is defined by
A(pI , D,DA) = {(pŶ n|In , pZ|Ŷ ) : pŶ n|In ∈ M(pI , D), pZ|Ŷ ∈ MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA)}
and is, in general, non-rectangular.
We now state the following theorem (for discrete alphabets):
Theorem 2.3 Assume that, for all n ≥ 1, the attacker knows pŶ n|In, the water-
mark decoder knows pZ|Ŷ , and the attack distortion constraint (2.7) is satisfied.
Then, a rate pair (RQ, RW ) is achievable (i.e., it satisfies Definition 2.6) if and
only if it belongs to the set
RdscD,DA =
{







pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
}
The proof of Theorem 2.3 can be found in Section 2.4.
Our final result in this section is the determination of the region of achievable
rate pairs (RQ, RW ) when all alphabets are continuous (and equal to R), I
n is
i.i.d. Gaussian with variance PI , and when both distortion functions d(·, ·), dA(·, ·)
are equal to the squared-error distortion function (2.4). In this case, Theorem 2.3
becomes:
Theorem 2.4 Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 2.3, a rate pair
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(RQ, RW ) is achievable if and only if it belongs to the set
RgaussD,DA =
{

































] ∩ {γ : γPW (γ) > DA} (2.13)
is empty, then no positive RW can be achieved for that particular RQ.
The proof of Theorem 2.4 can be found in Section 2.5.
2.1.3 Other Schemes
Finally, Section 2.6 contains achievable rate regions of other schemes; namely, the
public scenario of the regular QIM, as well the private scenario of additive schemes
[8, 32] in the presence of additive Gaussian noise. In both of these cases, the
achievable regions are subsets of the region derived in Theorem 2.2 (for βA = 1
and PV = DA).
2.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The coding theorem which establishes the region RdscD , consists of a converse and
a direct (achievability) part.
Converse Theorem
The converse theorem states that any (2nRQ , 2nRW , n) code which satisfies con-
straints (2.1) and (2.2) must satisfy (RQ, RW ) ∈ RdscD .
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Proof: Let ε > 0. We assume that the watermark index W is uniformly dis-
tributed in {1, . . . , 2nRW }, that Pr{W = Ŵ} < ε, and that the distortion constraint





Ed(Ij, Ŷj) = D (2.14)
By virtue of the monotonicity of the region RdscD in D, the constraint can then be
relaxed to an inequality, as in (2.1).
A standard converse rate-distortion theorem (e.g., [33]) yields
RQ ≥ 1
n
I(In; Ŷ n) ≥ rq(D) (2.15)




pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
I(I; Ŷ ) (2.16)
This establishes the lower bound on RQ in the definition of RdscD .
The upper bound on RW is obtained using two chains of inequalities. The first
chain is as follows:
RW = n
−1H(W )
= n−1H(W |In) (2.17)
= n−1I(W ; Ŷ n|In) + n−1H(W |Ŷ n, In) (2.18)
≤ n−1I(W ; Ŷ n|In) + n−1H(W |Zn, In) (2.19)
≤ n−1I(W ; Ŷ n|In) + ε (2.20)
= n−1H(Ŷ n|In) − n−1H(Ŷ n|In,W ) + ε
= n−1H(Ŷ n|In) + ε (2.21)
= n−1H(Ŷ n) − n−1(H(Ŷ n) − H(Ŷ n|In)) + ε
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≤ RQ − n−1I(Ŷ n; In) + ε (2.22)
= RQ − H(I) + n−1H(In|Ŷ n) + ε
≤ RQ − H(I) + n−1
n∑
j=1
H(Ij|Ŷj) + ε (2.23)
= RQ − n−1
n∑
j=1
I(Ij; Ŷj) + ε (2.24)
where (2.17) holds because In is independent of W ; (2.19) follows from the data
processing inequality applied to the Markov chain W → (Ŷ n, In) → (Zn, In);
(2.20) is a consequence of Fano’s inequality; (2.21) holds because Ŷ n is a deter-
ministic function of In,W , (2.22) follows from RQ ≥ n−1H(Ŷ n) and (2.23) is due
to the inequalities H(In|Ŷ n) ≤∑ni=1 H(Ij|Ŷ n) ≤∑nj=1 H(Ij|Ŷj).
The second chain of inequalities is as follows:
RW = n
−1H(W |In) (2.25)
= n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + n−1H(W |In, Zn)
≤ n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + ε (2.26)
= n−1H(Zn|In) − n−1H(Zn|In,W ) + ε






















I(Zj; Ŷj|Ij) + ε (2.31)
where (2.25) is due to the independence of In and W ; (2.26) follows from Fano’s
inequality; (2.27) holds because of the Markov chains (In,W ) → Ŷ n → Zn and
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Ŷ n → (In,W ) → Zn; (2.28) follows from the chain rule for the entropy; (2.29)
holds because the attack channel is memoryless and therefore given Ŷj, Zj is con-
ditionally independent of everything else and (2.30) follows because conditioning
reduces entropy.













We now observe that (2.32) depends only on the pmf’s pZj ,Ŷj ,Ij(z, ŷ, i) =
pZ|Ŷ (z|ŷ) pŶj |Ij(ŷ|i) pI(i), for each time instant j = 1, . . . , n (pZ|Ŷ and pI do not
depend on j due to memorylessness). Furthermore, RQ − I(Ij; Ŷj) and I(Zj; Ŷj|Ij)









I(Zj; Ŷj|Ij) ≤ Ia(Z; Ŷ |I) (2.34)
where, for the computation of the mutual information in the right-hand side of








was used. It is easy to establish that pa
Ŷ |I satisfies the one-dimensional distortion
constraint
Ed(I, Ŷ ) = D (2.36)
Then, combining (2.33), (2.34) and (2.36), from (2.32) we obtain













Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) + ε
≤ max
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )=D
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) + ε (2.37)
≤ max
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) + ε
where inequality (2.37) is due to (2.36). By letting ε → 0, we conclude the proof
of the converse.
Direct Theorem
We now show that RdscD is achievable.
Proof: As required for RdscD , we limit the quantization rate to RQ ≥ rq(D) (where
rq(D) was defined in (2.16)).
We use a random coding argument, where the watermark index W is assumed
uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2nRW }. The technique is similar to the private
version of regular QIM [16], in that 2nRW quantizers, each one indexed by a different
watermark, are employed.
Codebook Generation: A set of 2nRQ i.i.d. sequences Ỹ n, is generated, such that
each dimension is distributed according to some pmf pŶ . The set is then partitioned
into 2nRW subsets of 2nR1 sequences each, i.e.,
RQ = RW + R1
The wth subset, consisting of sequences Ỹ n(w, 1), . . . , Ỹ n(w, 2nR1), becomes the
codebook for the wth watermark.
Watermark Embedding: Given In and a deterministic w, the embedder iden-
tifies within the wth codebook the first codeword Ỹ n(w, q) such that the pair
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(In, Ỹ n(w, q)) lies in the set TI,Ŷ (ε) of typical pairs with respect to a bivari-
ate pI,Ŷ , such that the distortion constraint (2.1) is satisfied. The output of
the embedder (encoder) is denoted by Ŷ n(w) = Ỹ n(w, q). If none of the code-
words in the wth codebook is jointly typical with In, then the embedder outputs
Ŷ n(w) = 0. In this manner, 2nRW watermarked versions of the image In are ob-
tained: Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(2nRW ). Clearly, for random W , the embedder output is
Ŷ n(W ).
Decoding: Again, the decoder has access to the original image In. Upon receiving
Zn, the decoder seeks among all watermarked versions Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(2nRW ) of In
a single Ŷ n(ŵ) such that the triplet (In, Ŷ n(ŵ), Zn) lies in T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε), the set of
typical triplets with respect to the trivariate distribution pI,Ŷ ,Z , such that pI,Ŷ ,Z =
pZ|Ŷ pŶ ,I . If a unique such sequence Ŷ
n(ŵ) exists, then the decoder outputs Ŵ = ŵ;
otherwise, the decoder declares an error.
Error Events: Without loss of generality, we assume W = 1. We then have the
following error events:
• E1: Ŷ n(1) = 0, i.e., there exists no q ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR1} such that (In, Ỹ n(1, q)) ∈
TI,Ŷ .
• E2: There exists a Ỹ n(1, q) = Ŷ n(1) such that (In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ TI,Ŷ , but
(In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z .
• E3: (In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z but there also exists a k > 1 such that
(In, Ŷ n(k), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z .
The probability of error is then
Pr{Ŵ = 1} = Pr(E1) + Pr(E2) + Pr(E3)
31
Behavior of Pr(E1): From standard rate-distortion theorems [33], we know that
if R1 = RQ − RW > I(I; Ŷ ) (the mutual information of the bivariate pI,Ŷ defined
above), then Pr(E1) → 0 as n → ∞. Equivalently, if
RW ≤ RQ − I(I; Ŷ ) − ε (2.38)
then Pr(E1) → 0 as n → ∞.
Behavior of Pr(E2): To show that Pr(E2) → 0, it suffices to show that the triplet
(In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) lies in TI,Ŷ ,Z with probability approaching unity asymptotically. In
the previous paragraph, we showed that Pr{(In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ TI,Ŷ } → 1. Since Zn is
the output of a memoryless channel with conditional probability distribution pZ|Ŷ
(that was used for the generation of the typical set TI,Ŷ ,Z), it can be easily verified
that Zn is typical with In, Ŷ n(1) as well, with probability that approaches unity.
Behavior of Pr(E3):




Pr{(In, Ŷ n(w), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z}
= (2nRW − 1) Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z} (2.39)
where the last equality is due to the symmetry of the random code statistics. Since
Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2)) ∈ TI,Ŷ } → 1
and by construction, Zn is independent of Ŷ n(2) given In, a standard argument
(cf. the proof of Theorem 8.6.1 in [33]) yields
Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2), Zn) ∈ TI,Ŷ ,Z} ≤ 2−n(I(Z;Ŷ |I)−(ε/2))
where the conditional mutual information is computed with respect to the trivari-
ate pI,Ŷ ,Z defined earlier. Hence, if
RW ≤ I(Z; Ŷ |I) − ε (2.40)
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it follows that the upper bound on Pr(E3) in (2.39) vanishes asymptotically.
Thus, combining (2.38) and (2.40) and letting ε → 0, we obtain the achievable
rate
RW ≤ Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) (2.41)
Then by maximizing (2.41) with respect to pŶ |I such that the distortion constraint
(2.1) is met, we obtain the required result.
We have thus proved that if (RQ, RW ) ∈ RdscD , then the average probability of
error, over the ensemble of random codes, vanishes asymptotically with n. By a
standard argument, there exists a deterministic code that achieves RdscD with arbi-
trarily small probability of error (averaged over all the messages); and the codebook
can be then expurgated to make the maximal probability of error arbitrarily small.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
As in the discrete case, here too we have a direct and a converse part.
Converse Theorem
The converse part states that if constraints (2.2) and (2.5) are satisfied by some
(2nRQ , 2nRW , n) code, then the rates (RQ, RW ) must lie in RgaussD , as defined in the
statement of the theorem.
Proof: Let ε > 0. We assume that the watermark index W is uniformly dis-
tributed in {1, . . . , 2nRW }, that Pr{W = Ŵ} < ε, and that the distortion constraint





E(Ij − Ŷj)2 = D (2.42)
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This establishes the lower bound on RQ in the definition of RgaussD .
The derivation of the upper bound on RW can be simplified by considering the
L2-space spanned by vectors I
n and Ŷ n, with inner product defined by








for any random vectors Un, V n. The geometry of this space is shown in Figure
2.4, where the circle C has radius √D corresponding to the distortion constraint











j ); while the angle between the two vectors is denoted by φ.
As can be seen from Figure 2.4, when PI ≥ D, the maximum φmax of φ is obtained




Otherwise, if PI < D, φ can take any value in [0, π] (due to symmetry, we ignore
negative angles). Note that for every φ (except when PI ≥ D and φ = φmax), the
line on which Ŷ n lies, meets C at two points. Equivalently, for every γ ∆= sin−2(φ)
with γ ≥ max{1, PI/D}, there are two positions of Ŷ n on C (the position farther
from the origin is shown in every case in Figure 2.4).
Let λ0I
n be the projection of Ŷ n on In, or equivalently, the MMSE estimator



































































Figure 2.4: The 2nd moment space L2 spanned by vectors I
n and Ŷ n, shown for
three different values of φ. The top figures correspond to the case PI ≥ D, while the
bottom figures correspond to PI < D. The circle C is the locus of all Ŷ n such that
n−1E||In− Ŷ n||2 = D. As φ increases from 0, PW (γ) increases monotonically (case
(a)) until it reaches its maximum value D (case (b)), then decreases monotonically
until φ = φmax (case (c)). We do not consider the case φ > π/2 when PI < D,
since it gives the same value for γ and PW (γ) as the angle π − φ.
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From the geometry of Figure 2.4, using the Pythagorean theorem, it easily follows
that
PŶ |I(γ − 1) =
(PI + PŶ − D)2
4PI
(2.45)
PŶ (= γPŶ |I) can then be eliminated to yield a quadratic equation for PŶ |I in
terms of PI , D and γ, with roots
PŶ |I =
γ(PI + D) − 2PI ± 2
√
PI(γD − PI)(γ − 1)
γ2
(2.46)
Consistent with our earlier observation, there are two possible values of PŶ |I for
every φ (< φmax if PI ≥ D) or equivalently, for every γ ≥ max{1, PI/D}. The
larger value is precisely PW (γ), as defined in (2.6).
The mutual information between In and Ŷ n is also related to the geometry of
Figure 2.4. Specifically, if µ0Ŷ
n is the projection of In onto Ŷ n, we have
I(In; Ŷ n) = h(In) − h(In|Ŷ n)
= h(In) − h(In − µ0Ŷ n|Ŷ n)
≥ h(In) − h(In − µ0Ŷ n)
The differential entropy of In − µ0Ŷ n is upper-bounded by that of an i.i.d.
Gaussian vector having components of the same variance. By concavity of the
logarithm, we then have














where PI|Ŷ is defined similarly to PŶ |I . Therefore
1
n






























As in the discrete case, the upper bound on RW is obtained using two parallel
chains of inequalities. The first chain is identical to inequalities (2.17)-(2.22).
Thus, from (2.22) we obtain
RW ≤ RQ − n−1I(Ŷ n; In) + ε (2.48)
and together with (2.47), we finally obtain (for any value of γ corresponding to
the geometry of In and Ŷ n)
RW ≤ RQ − 1
2
log(γ) + ε (2.49)
The second chain of inequalities is as follows (where λ0 was defined in (2.44)):
RW = n
−1H(W |In) (2.50)
= n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + n−1H(W |In, Zn)
≤ n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + ε (2.51)
= n−1h(Zn|In) − n−1h(Zn|In,W ) + ε
= n−1h(Zn|In) − n−1h(V n|In,W ) + ε (2.52)
= n−1h(βAŶ n − βAλ0In + V n|In) − n−1h(V n) + ε (2.53)





log(2πe)(β2APŶ |I + PV ) −
1
2












where (2.50) holds because In is independent of W ; (2.51) follows from Fano’s
inequality; (2.52) holds because Ŷ n is a function of In and W ; (2.53) follows from
the independence of V n and (In,W ); and (2.54) holds by the usual Gaussian bound
on differential entropy.












































and taking ε → 0, we obtain the upper bound on RW in the definition of RgaussD .
The Upper Boundary of the Rate Region
Before proceeding to the proof of the direct theorem, it is instructive to examine




























Note that since RQ is variable, the range of interest for γ is [max{1, PI/D},∞).
The second argument of min{·, ·} in (2.58) is independent of RQ and monotone
in PW (γ). From the proof of the converse theorem above, we know that
√
PW (γ)
is the length of the error vector Ŷ n −λ0In when In and Y n are as shown in Figure
2.4, with sin−2(φ) = γ. Clearly,
√
PW (γ) increases monotonically as φ increases




D/(PI + D)); then decreases
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monotonically as φ increases to φmax = arcsin(min{1,
√
D/PI}). Equivalently





to γ = 1 +
PI
D












similar behavior, and is plotted in Figure 2.5 against 1
2
log(γ). The initial (leftmost)













The first argument of min{·, ·} in (2.58) involves RQ and decreases monotoni-








to zero as γ ranges over the interval
[max{1, PI
D
}, 22RQ ] of maximization in (2.58). Plotted against 1
2
log(γ), it yields
a line segment of slope −1 (in Figure 2.5), whose position on the graph depends
on the value of RQ.
The behavior of rW (RQ) as RQ varies can be examined with the aid of Figure
2.5. There are three regimes of interest:
(a) In the first regime, the straight line segment lies entirely below the curve
(Figure 2.5(a)). The maximin in (2.58) is then given by the maximum ordinate
























(b) In the second regime, the straight line segment intersects the rising portion
of the curve (Figure 2.5(b)). The maximin in (2.58) is then given by the ordinate at
the point of intersection (this value is given by the root of a cubic equation). This


































). In this case, the straight line segment either intersects the































































































Figure 2.5: (c): Determination of the maximin value when RQ belongs to the third
regime (continued from previous page).
The maximin value in (2.58) is then given by the maximum ordinate on the curve,






). Note that this upper bound on RW also follows
by a simpler argument, namely that RW can be no higher than the capacity of
an AWGN channel with signal (i.e., watermark) power β2AD and noise power PV
(when no quantization noise is present, i.e., RQ = ∞).
The three regimes obtained above correspond to the three segments AB, BC
and C∞ of the upper boundary of RgaussD described in Section 2.1.
Note: In the special case PV = 0 (no attack), the curve in Figure 2.5 is displaced









. The converse theorem then reduces to the channel coding part
of the converse theorem in [35], and also the converse theorem of [8] for RF = 0.
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Direct Theorem
We now show that RgaussD is achievable.








. We use a
random coding argument, similar to the discrete case (proved in Section 2.2).





. A set of 2nRQ i.i.d. ∼
N (0, γPW (γ)) Gaussian sequences Ỹ n, is generated and partitioned into 2nRW sub-
sets of 2nR1 sequences each, i.e.,
RQ = RW + R1 (2.59)
The wth subset, consisting of sequences Ỹ n(w, 1), . . . , Ỹ n(w, 2nR1), becomes the
codebook for the wth watermark.
Watermark Embedding: The procedure here is identical to the one given in the
proof of Theorem 2.1. That is, from In and watermark index w the embedder
identifies within the wth codebook the first codeword Ỹ n(w, q) such that the pair
(In, Ỹ n(w, q)) lies in a typical set TI,Ŷ (ε). The set TI,Ŷ (ε) of typical pairs is con-






(γ − 1)PIPW (γ)√
(γ − 1)PIPW (γ) γPW (γ)


Note that the second moments in KI,Ŷ are consistent with the geometry of Figure


















are within ε (or a factor thereof) of the average values shown implicitly in Figure
2.4. This also means that the distortion constraint (2.42) is essentially met (since
ε-differences can be safely ignored).
Decoding: Upon receiving Zn = Ŷ n(W ) + V n, the decoder seeks among all water-
marked versions Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(2nRW ) of In a single Ŷ n(ŵ) such that the triplet
(In, Ŷ n(ŵ), Zn) lies in T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε), the set of typical triplets with respect to the






(γ − 1)PIPW (γ) βA
√
(γ − 1)PIPW (γ)√
(γ − 1)PIPW (γ) γPW (γ) βAγPW (γ)
βA
√
(γ − 1)PIPW (γ) βAγPW (γ) β2AγPW (γ) + PV


If a unique such sequence Ŷ n(ŵ) exists, then the decoder outputs Ŵ = ŵ; other-
wise, the decoder declares an error.
Note that pI,Ŷ ,Z(i, ŷ, z) = pI,Ŷ (i, ŷ)pV (z − ŷ), where pV is the marginal of the
attack noise V n.
Error Events: Carrying out the same analysis as in the proof of the discrete-case
theorem, we find that the probability of error Pr{W = Ŵ} can be arbitrarily small
as long
RW < min{RQ − I(I; Ŷ ), I(Z; Ŷ |I)} (2.60)
and since (from the definition of the typical sets TI,Ŷ , TI,Ŷ ,Z) we have I(I; Ŷ ) =
1
2




























so as to maximize the right-hand side of
(2.61), we can achieve the whole region RgaussD .
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This proof holds for random codes; however, using a standard expurgation
argument we can argue that there exists a deterministic code such that the maximal
probability of error is made arbitrarily small, for sufficiently large codelength n.
2.4 Proof of Theorem 2.3
We begin with the converse part of Theorem 2.3.
Converse Part
This part shows that every achievable rate (RQ, RW ) (under the assumption that
the attacker knows pŶ n|In , the decoder knows pZ|Ŷ and (2.7) is satisfied) must lie
in RdscD,DA .
Proof: Let ε > 0. The watermarker chooses an encoding function f such that




thus establishing the lower bound on RQ. Now, since (RQ, RW ) is achievable, we
know that for every pZ|Ŷ ∈ MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA), we have Pe < ε. Therefore, the
converse of Theorem 2.1 (and hence inequality (2.32)) applies for every pZ|Ŷ ∈
MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA). Thus
RW ≤ min














We can now use inequalities (2.33) and (2.34) to upper bound (2.62) and obtain
RW ≤ min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,pŶ n|In ,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , p
a
Ŷ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) + ε (2.63)
where the single-letter pmf pa
Ŷ |I , was defined in (2.35).
44
We now prove that MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA) = MA(pI , (paŶ |I)n, DA) as follows:






































pZ|Ŷ (z|ŷ) pI(i) paŶ |I(ŷ|i) dA(ŷ, z) ≤ DA
}
= MA(pI , (paŶ |I)n, DA) (2.65)
where the equality in (2.64) is due to that fact that all variables {Ŷj, Zj, Ij, j =
1, . . . , n} have the same support set as Ŷ1, Z1, I1 respectively. Hence, from (2.63)
and (2.65) we obtain
RW ≤ min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(paŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , p
a




pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) + ε
(2.66)
where the last inequality stems from the fact that, as we saw in Section 2.2, pa
Ŷ |I
satisfies the one-dimensional distortion constraint (2.36). Finally, by letting ε → 0,
we conclude the proof.
Direct Part
The achievability of RdscD,DA is proved next.
Proof: Here, we use the proof of the direct part of Theorem 2.1. More specifically,
we generate a random code exactly as in that proof, for a rate pair (RQ, RW ) ∈
RdscD,DA . Observe that the design of the encoder is oblivious of the attack channel
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(as required by the rules of the game), and remains fixed for any distribution pZ|Ŷ .
The conditional distribution pŶ n|In chosen by the encoder is p
∗






pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(p∗Ŷ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
is maximized under the condition that p∗
Ŷ |I ∈ Mml(pI , D).
Assume now that the attacker uses some distribution p′
Z|Ŷ ∈
MA(pI , (p∗Ŷ |I)n, DA). By the proof of Theorem 2.1 we know that the decoder
(which presumably knows p′
Z|Ŷ ), is able to detect the watermark with vanishing





pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
= min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(p∗Ŷ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , p
∗
Ŷ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
≤ Ξ(RQ, pI , p∗Ŷ |I , p′Z|Ŷ ) (2.67)
as required.
In order to complete the proof, we need to prove that there exists a deter-
ministic code with arbitrarily small probability of error for all possible attack
channels. As is explained in [36], using random coding arguments for proving
achievability results for a family of channels is not as straighforward as in the
case of fixed channels. In our case, the family of channels is determined by the
set MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA). As we proved, for each pZ|Ŷ ∈ MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA), the
average probability of error over the ensemble of random codes is small. However,
this does not immediately guarantee the existence of a single deterministic code
which is simultaneously good for all pZ|Ŷ ∈ MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA). In principle, for
each pZ|Ŷ , a different deterministic code could achieve small probability of error.
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Existence of a deterministic code that achieves RdscD,DA can indeed be estab-
lished using the same technique as in proving the existence of a deterministic code
for compound channels [37]. This technique consists of: (a) first approximating
MA(pI , (p∗Ŷ |I)n, DA) by a discrete set that contains sufficiently many channel distri-
butions; (b) showing existence of a good code for a single (not compound) channel
whose distribution function is an “average” of the distribution functions of the
discrete set; and (c) proving that the code obtained in (b) can be used for the
entire compound channel, with the original set of channel distributions.
2.5 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Theorem 2.3 can be applied to the continuous case as well. Replacing sums with
integrals and pmf’s with pdf’s (where applicable), we can obtain a proof for the
maximal achievable rate region for the case where
• I = Ŷ = Z = R.
• In is i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian with variance PI . The distribution of I is
denoted pGI for simpicity.
• d(x, y) = dA(x, y) = (x − y)2.
Direct application of Theorem 2.3 gives:
RgaussD,DA =
{













pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
}
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since we know that the rate-distortion function of an i.i.d. Gaussian source of
variance PI and distortion constraint D is given by
min
pŶ |I :E(I−Ŷ )2≤D













pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)



















where Γ(RQ, D,DA) was defined in (2.13).
In order to prove (2.68), we show that the left-hand side of (2.68) is upper- and



















Observe that for any pŶ |I ∈ Mml(pGI , D) and any pZ|Ŷ ∈ MA(pGI , (pŶ |I)n, DA),
the n-variate i.i.d. extensions of the scalar random variables I, Ŷ , Z, whose joint
distribution is pGI pŶ |I pZ|Ŷ , are consistent with the L2-space geometry of Section
2.3. The quantities γ, PW (γ), PŶ are defined similarly here.
Upper bound
We now define a class of conditional probabilities {p′
Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I)} such that
(∀ pŶ |I ∈ Mml(pGI , D)) p′Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I) ∈ MA(pGI , (pŶ |I)n, DA)




pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)





I , pŶ |I , p
′
Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I)) (2.69)
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The construction of the class p′
Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I) is as follows:
Case 1
If PŶ = E(Ŷ
2) ≤ DA then p′Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I)(z|ŷ) = δ(z), i.e., Z = 0. Observe that
p′
Z|Ŷ ∈ MA(pGI , (pŶ |I)n, DA) since E[(Ŷ − Z)2] = E(Ŷ 2) ≤ DA. Thus, the upper
bound of (2.69) is zero in this case. In terms of the notation of Section 2.3 (proof
of Theorem 2.2), the condition PŶ ≤ DA is equivalent to γPW (γ) ≤ DA, and hence
Γ(RQ, D,DA) is empty.
Case 2
If PŶ > DA or, equivalently,
γPW (γ) > DA (2.70)
then p′
Z|Ŷ (pŶ |I) = N (βAŶ , PV ) where
βA = 1 − DA
E(Ŷ 2)
, PV = βADA
In other words, Z = βAŶ + V , where V is zero-mean Gaussian with variance PV ,
independent from I, Ŷ . It is straightforward to show that E[(Ŷ − Z)2] = DA in
this case.
We now have
I(Z; Ŷ |I) = h(Z|I) − h(V )
and applying the chain of inequalities (2.53)-(2.55), we obtain






















where the actual values of βA and PV were used in the last equality. Also, from
(2.47), we obtain
I(I; Ŷ ) ≥ 1
2
log(γ) (2.73)




pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)





































where (2.75) holds because the right-hand side of (2.74) depends only on γ, whose
range is determined by (2.56) and by (2.70).
We now proceed to prove the lower bound.
Lower Bound
Firstly, if Γ(RQ, D,DA) is empty, we set the lower bound to be trivially equal to
zero, as required by the theorem.
If Γ(RQ, D,DA) is non empty, we consider a conditional probability p̃Ŷ |I such that
(I, Ŷ ) are jointly zero-mean Gaussian with respect to the covariance matrix KI,Ŷ





(γ − 1)PIPW (γ)√
(γ − 1)PIPW (γ) γPW (γ)


where γ, PW (γ) are defined similarly to Section 2.3. Moreover, we set


















Also, the matrix KI,Ŷ is consistent with the L2-space geometry of Section 2.3, and
hence the distortion constraint (2.42) is satisfied. Therefore,






pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, p
G
I , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ )
≥ min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(p̃Ŷ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, p
G










where (2.77) was obtained by substituting I(I; Ŷ ) with 1
2
log(γ) (from the Gaus-
sianity of p̃Ŷ |I).
We now have the following chain of inequalities:
I(Z; Ŷ |I) = I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z − λ0κI|I) (2.78)
= h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I|Z − λ0κI, I) (2.79)
≥ h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I|Z − λ0κI) (2.80)
= I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z − λ0κI) (2.81)
where λ0 is the linear MMSE coefficient for estimating Ŷ given I (defined in (2.44))
and κ = 0 is an arbitrary constant; (2.79) was obtained since Ŷ − λ0I is orthog-
onal to I (and hence they are independent); and (2.80) is due to the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy.
Let Z̃ be a zero-mean Gaussian random variable such that (I, Ŷ , Z̃) are jointly
Gaussian and have the same second moments as (I, Ŷ , Z). A lower bound to (2.81)
can be obtained as follows:
I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z − λ0κI)
= h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I|Z − λ0κI)
= h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I − µ(Z − λ0κI)|Z − λ0κI), µ = 0 (2.82)
≥ h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I − µ(Z − λ0κI)) (2.83)
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≥ h(Ŷ − λ0I) − 1
2
log(E[(Ŷ − λ0(1 − µ)I − µZ)2]) (2.84)
= h(Ŷ − λ0I) − 1
2
log(E[(Ŷ − λ0(1 − µ)I − µZ̃)2]) (2.85)
= h(Ŷ − λ0I) − h(Ŷ − λ0I − µ(Z̃ − λ0κI)|Z∗ − λ0κI) (2.86)
= I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z̃ − λ0κI) (2.87)
where µ in (2.82) is the linear MMSE coefficient for estimating Ŷ − λ0I given
Z − λ0κI (hence, Ŷ − λ0I − µ(Z − λ0κI) is orthogonal to Z − λ0κI); (2.83)
was obtained because conditioning reduces entropy; (2.84) is due to the Gaussian
entropy upper bound; (2.85) is from the definition of Z̃; and (2.86) holds because
Ŷ − λ0I − µ(Z̃ − λ0κI) is independent of Z̃ − λ0κI (since they are Gaussian and
uncorrelated).
From (2.77), (2.81) and (2.87) we obtain
min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(p̃Ŷ |I)n,DA)
I(Z; Ŷ |I)
≥ min
pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(p̃Ŷ |I)n,DA)
I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z̃ − λ0κI)
= min
E(Z̃Ŷ ),E(Z̃2): E[(Z̃−Ŷ )2]≤DA
I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z̃ − λ0κI) (2.88)
where the last equality is because the quantity I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z̃ − λ0κI) depends on
pZ|Ŷ only through the second moments E(Z̃Ŷ ) = E(ZŶ ) and E(Z̃
2) = E(Z2)
(since Z̃ is Gaussian).
Since Ŷ , Z̃ are jointly Gaussian, we can express them in the form:
Z̃ = κŶ + U
where κ is the same as used in (2.88), and U is a zero-mean Gaussian variable
independent of Ŷ and I (because of the Markov condition (2.12)). Therefore,
E(Z̃Ŷ ) = κγPW (γ) and E(Z̃












Figure 2.6: The L2 space spanned by variables Ŷ and Z̃, shown for the maximum
possible θ = θmax (when PŶ > DA).
Hence, we have
I(Ŷ − λ0I; Z̃ − λ0κI)
= h(Z̃ − λ0κI) − h(Z̃ − λ0κI|Ŷ − λ0I)

















Therefore, (2.88) is equal to
min










We observe now that minimizing the ratio κ2/PU in (2.90) is equivalent to mini-
mizing the ratio κ2PŶ /PU . This ratio is equal to cot
2(θ), where θ is shown in the
L2-space of Figure 2.6. Therefore, for computing the minimum in (2.90), it suffices
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to maximize θ. We consider the following two cases: (i) if PŶ = γPW (γ) ≤ DA
then the maximum possible θ is π/2 and hence (2.90) is equal to zero (note that
Γ(RQ, D,DA) is empty in this case); (ii) if γPW (γ) > DA, then θ is maximized when
Z̃ is tangent to the circle CG and E[(Ŷ −Z̃)2] = DA; in this case cot2(θ) = γPW (γ)DA −1
















pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, p
G




















Combining (2.75) and (2.92), the theorem is proved.




pZ|Ŷ ∈MA(pGI ,(pŶ |I)n,DA)
Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) (2.93)
is upper- and lower-bounded by a suitable quantity. In the course of the proof,
it became apparent that, in most cases of interest (that is, PŶ > DA), the most






Ŷ n + V n (2.94)
where V n is i.i.d. Gaussian, independent of Ŷ n, with variance (1− DA
PŶ
)DA. As can
be seen in Figure 2.6, this particular attack is equivalent to optimally quantizing
an i.i.d. Gaussian source at distortion DA. This attack has been proved to be
optimal (from the attacker’s point of view) in other watermarking schemes, as well
[22, 24].
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As we pointed out in Section 2.1, the set of admissible encoding and attack
distributions A(pI , D,DA) is non-rectangular, since MA(pI , pŶ n|In , DA) depends
on the choice of pŶ n|In . Therefore, one cannot use any concavity and convexity
properties of Ξ(RQ, pI , pŶ |I , pZ|Ŷ ) in order to establish the existence of a saddle-
point that would give the value of (2.93). The approach we followed in this section
(i.e., finding upper and lower bounds to (2.93)) overcomes this difficulty. Similar
techniques were followed by [22, 24].
2.6 Performance of Other Schemes
In this section we present achievability results for certain schemes that combine
watermarking and compression. Specifically, we investigate the relationship be-
tween watermarking and quantization rates in the presence of additive memoryless
Gaussian noise of variance DA, for the following systems:
• Regular Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [16], where no knowledge of
the original image is available at the decoder (public scenario).
• Additive watermarking, where the embedder computes the weighted sum of
the original image and a watermark-dependent signal and then compresses
the resulting vector using a universal (watermark non-specific) quantizer. A
private detection scenario is assumed in this case.
Although our focus is on achievability results, the rate region RgaussD derived in
Section 2.3 (for βA = 1 and PV = DA,) can be taken as an outer bound on the
achievable rate region of both schemes considered in this section.
A. Regular Quantization Index Modulation, Public Scenario
We consider the regular version of QIM [16] (distinct from distortion-compensated
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QIM), since we require the output of the embedding process to be a quantized
image (corresponding to an index in a source codebook).
Essentially, here we have an ensemble of 2nRW quantizers and their codebooks.
Each quantizer corresponds to a different watermark index, and covers the entire
image space with 2n(RQ−RW ) representation vectors (codewords). The watermark
W is embedded into an original image In by quantizing In using the W th quantizer,
yielding a representation vector Ŷ n. Detection of the watermark W in a (possibly
corrupted) image Zn entails mapping Zn to a representation vector taken from
the union of the 2nRW codebooks; the index of the codebook which contains that
vector becomes the estimate Ŵ of the watermark W . (By contrast, the private
detection scenario used in the proof of the direct theorem of Section 2.3 mapped
Zn to one of 2nRW representation vectors, each taken from a different codebook.)
As discussed in [16], achievable pairs (RQ, RW ) for regular QIM (also called
“hidden” QIM) under constraints (2.1) and (2.2) can be found using a well-known
formula due to Gel’fand and Pinsker [13]:
RQ = I(Ŷ ; Z) = I(Ŷ ; Ŷ + V ) (2.95)
RW = [I(Ŷ ; Z) − I(Ŷ ; I)]+ (2.96)
The trivariate distribution pI,Ŷ ,Z(i, ŷ, z), can be taken as the Gaussian in the proof
of the direct theorem in Section 2.3. Thus pI,Ŷ ,Z(i, ŷ, z) = pI,Ŷ (i, ŷ)pV (z − ŷ),
where I and V = Z − Ŷ are independent with mean zero and variances PI and
DA respectively; and Ŷ also has mean zero and satisfies E(Ŷ − I)2 = D. It should
be noted again that the second moments of pI,Ŷ ,Z(i, ŷ, z) are consistent with the
geometry of Figure 2.4.
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We briefly investigate the behavior of (2.96) as RQ (given by (2.95)) varies.
Letting PŶ = γPW (γ) = E(Ŷ





















Setting PŶ |I = PW (γ) = PŶ /γ in (2.45) and expressing γ in terms of PI , PŶ and









PIDA(22RQ − 1) − 14(PI + DA(22RQ − 1) − D)2
)]+
(2.99)


























whose exact endpoints are given by the roots of a cubic. Expression (2.99) is
shown in Figure 2.7 as the dashed-dotted curved line. One can trivially achieve
the rest of the region (below the horizontal, dashed-dotted line), by appending
extra “dummy” bits to the output of the quantizer (thus increasing the rate RQ).
As can be seen from Figure 2.7, the watermarking rate RW obtained using i.i.d.
Gaussian codebooks is positive only for a finite range of values of RQ (without
appending the trivial bits). This is explained by the fact that as the quantization
rate increases, the quantization cells shrink and thus it becomes increasingly likely
that a corrupted image will be mistaken for an image generated by another quan-






















Figure 2.7: Inner bounds on the achievable rate regions for public QIM and private
additive schemes. RgaussD , for βA = 1 and PV = DA, is an outer bound on the
achievable rate regions of both schemes.
not arise when additive watermarking schemes (see, e.g., [31, 8]) are used. The
analysis of such an additive scheme follows.
B. Additive Watermarking, Private Scenario
Additive watermarking schemes (see, e.g., [31, 8]) are immune to the problem
discussed above, as they use a single quantizer which is not dependent on the
embedded watermark. From a complexity/cost viewpoint, they are particularly
attractive in applications where the same image is distributed to different cus-
tomers (i.e., the embedded watermark is a fingerprint identifying the customer),
as customers can use the same codebook in order to reconstruct their image.
In general, additive watermarking reduces to the computation of
Y n = αIn + βxn(W ) (2.100)
where W is the index of the watermark and xn(·) is a n-dimensional signal that
does not depend on the original image In. α, β are non-zero scalars. To further
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compress Y n, a universal quantizer (i.e., one that does not depend on the water-
mark embedded in Y n) can be used:
Ŷ n = f(Y n)
subject to an appropriate distortion constraint ((2.1) in this case). The decoder
attempts to detect W given Ŷ n and In with vanishing probability of error.
We obtain an inner bound on the achievable (RQ, RW ) region using a random
coding argument. First, we note that compressing Y n is equivalent to compress-
ing α−1Y n, which effectively eliminates the parameter α in (2.100); and that the
parameter β can be absorbed in the power of the watermark. Thus we use the
simpler form
Y n = In + xn(W )
The watermarker generates a random channel codebook {Xn(1), . . . , Xn(2nRW )},
all components of which are i.i.d. Gaussian with variance PX ; and a random source
codebook {Ỹ n(1), . . . , Ỹ n(2nRQ)} , also i.i.d. Gaussian with variance PŶ , where
both PX and PŶ are free parameters in the model.
Y n is encoded as Ŷ n = Ỹ n(q), where q is the smallest index such that the
pair (Y n, Ỹ n(q)) is jointly typical with respect to a bivariate Gaussian pY,Ŷ having
mean zero and covariance
KY,Ŷ =

 PI + PX PI+PX2PI (PI + PŶ − D)
PI+PX
2PI
(PI + PŶ − D) PŶ


Without going into detail, it is not difficult to show that joint typicality of Y n
and Ŷ n = Ỹ n(q) implies that the per-letter distortion between In and Ŷ n is, with
probability approaching unity, no larger than D + ε, which in turn implies that
the distortion constraint (2.1) is essentially satisfied. By the usual rate-distortion
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argument, taking
RQ = I(Y ; Ŷ ) + ε (2.101)
ensures that, with probability approaching unity, a jointly typical pair (Y n, Ỹ n(q))





equality iff PX=0 and PI = PŶ + D.)
Upon receiving Zn = Ŷ n + V n, the watermark detector attempts to find a
unique w such that the triplet (In, Xn(w), Zn) is jointly typical with respect to a

















(This distribution is consistent with pY,Ŷ and the additive noise distribution pV
in the sense that pZ|I,X(z|i, x) =
∫
ŷ
pY,Ŷ (i + x, ŷ)pV (z − ŷ)dŷ/pY (i + x).) Again,
without going into detail, it can be shown that if
RW = I(X; I, Z) − ε (2.102)
then the probability of decoding error vanishes as n → ∞.
Solving (2.101) for PX , then substituting into (2.102) and letting ε → 0, we






22RQ(2D(PI + PŶ ) − D2 − (PI − PŶ )2 + 4DAPI)
4PI(22RQDA + PŶ )
)
(2.103)





. (2.103) is maximized for
PŶ = −22RQDA +
√
(22RQDA + D)2 + PI(PI + 2DA(22RQ − 2) − 2D)
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The corresponding curve is also shown in Figure 2.7 (the region below it being an
inner bound on the achievable region for this additive scheme). As expected, when
RQ → ∞, Ŷ n is negligibly different from Y n = In + Xn and thus RW approaches
the capacity of an AWGN channel.
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Chapter 3
Fingerprinting and Collusion Attacks
In this chapter, we extend the results of Chapter 2 to the case of fingerprinting. As
we mentioned in Chapter 1, fingerprinting is used for tracking illegal distributors
of a protected image. More precisely, the information hider creates different finger-
printed versions of an image and distributes each to a respective customer. Each
customer thus receives an image containing a fingerprint which uniquely identifies
him. If a fingerprint is detected in an illegally distributed copy, then it is likely
that the customer, to whom the fingerprint was assigned, is responsible for the
illegal distribution.
Fingerprinting, like watermarking, has to adhere to some transparency and
robustness requirements. That is, each fingerprinted copy should be of the same
(or comparable) quality as the original image; and the hidden fingerprint should
be recoverable even after degradation (possibly due to a malicious attack) of the
protected work. An important consideration in fingerprinting is that attacks can
be made more effective through collusion: two or more users who possess different
fingerprinted copies of the same image can collude to produce a forgery. The
fingerprint detector will then attempt to detect all the colluders (that is, all the
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fingerprint indices) from the forgery.
Fingerprinting has attracted considerable attention during the recent years.
Most work has focused on designing practical codes which are resistant to collusion
attacks [38, 39, 40, 11]; little work has been done on information-theoretic aspects
in terms of achievable rates [8, 41]. This chapter gives results on achievable rate
regions in the presence of quantization.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1 we summarize our results;
Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 contain proofs of the theorems.
3.1 Summary of the Results
3.1.1 Discrete and Continuous Alphabets
The general form of the system under consideration is shown in Figure 3.1. The
information hider creates 2nRF fingerprinted copies Ŷ n(1, In), . . . , Ŷ n(2nRF , In) of
In, and distributes them to an equal number of customers using nRQ bits per
customer. We now assume that k (out of 2nRF ) customers collude by combining
their copies {Ŷ n(W1, In), . . . , Ŷ n(Wk, In)} and produce a forgery Zn. Then Zn,
together with In (in a private scenario), are provided to the fingerprint decoder,
which outputs an estimate {Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk} of {W1, . . . ,Wk}. Note that we have
successful detection if all the fingerprint indices are correctly detected; this does not
necessarily require Ŵl = Wl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. In other words, the decoder tries to
estimate the set {W1, . . . ,Wk}, or, equivalently, any permutation of (W1, . . . ,Wk).
The indices W1, . . . ,Wk are all distinct and the vector (W1, . . . ,Wk) is uniformly
distributed in the set



























Figure 3.1: The general fingerprinting/quantization system with memoryless col-
lusion attacks.
Note that the size of F(n, k) is J(n, k) ∆= |F(n, k)| = Jn!
(Jn−k)! , where Jn = 2
nRF .





where we use the notation an
.
= 2n(b±ε) to mean
∣∣∣∣ 1n log an − b
∣∣∣∣ < ε
for n sufficiently large [33]. Furthermore,
Pr{Wl = wl} = Pr{W1 = w1} = (Jn − 1)!






We further assume that k, as well as the attack channel conditional distribution,
are known to the fingerprint encoder and decoder. Similarly to Chapter 2, here










We assume that k ≥ 2 and that it is fixed in n. The case k = 1 is the case
of no collusion, treated in Chapter 2. For simplicity, we use the notation Ŷ nl =
Ŷ n(Wl, I
n).
We now have the following definitions:
Definition 3.1 A (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) private quantization/fingerprinting code consists
of the following:
• A fingerprint set Fn = {1, . . . , 2nRF }.
• An encoding function f : Fn × In → Ŷn which maps a fingerprint index w
and an image sequence in to a representation sequence ŷn taken from the set
{ŷn(1), . . . , ŷn(2nRQ)}.
• A decoding function g(k) : Zn × In → F(n, k), which maps the output of
the channel zn and the original image in to an estimate (ŵ1, . . . , ŵk) of a
permutation of (w1, . . . , wk).
Definition 3.2 The probability of error in detecting fingerprints (w1, . . . , wk) is
given by
Pe(w1, . . . , wk) =
Pr{g(k)(Zn, In) ∈ P(w1, . . . , wk)|Ŷ n1 = f(w1, In), . . . , Ŷ nk = f(wk, In)}
where P(S) is the set of all permutations of the ordered set S. Furthermore, the





Pe(w1, . . . , wk)
and is equal to Pr{(Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ∈ P(W1, . . . ,Wk)} when the fingerprint index
vector (W1, . . . ,Wk) is uniformly distributed in F(n, k).
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Definition 3.3 For a (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) quantization/fingerprinting code, the aver-






assuming that W is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2nRF }.
Definition 3.4 A rate pair (RQ, RF ) is achievable for distortion constraint D,
if there exists a sequence of quantization/fingerprinting codes (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) such
that
D̄ ≤ D (3.2)
max
w1,...,wk
Pe(w1, . . . , wk) → 0 as n → ∞ (3.3)
Moreover, a rate region R of pairs (RQ, RF ) is achievable if every element of R is
achievable.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 A private quantization/fingerprinting code (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) satisfies
the transparency and robustness requirements (3.2) and (3.3), respectively, if and
only if (RQ, RF ) ∈ Rdsc, FD , where
Rdsc, FD =
{
(RQ, RF ) :
RQ ≥ min
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
I(Ŷ ; I)
RF ≤ max
pŶ |I :Ed(I,Ŷ )≤D
min
{










where Sl is any subset of {1, . . . , k} with l elements, and S̄l = {1, . . . , k}−Sl. For





The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in Section 3.2.
We have also considered a continuous-alphabet, Gaussian analogue of Theorem
3.1. In particular, if we assume that (i) all (single-letter) alphabets are equal
to R, (ii) the image In is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance PI , (iii) the distortion






n where λk,l are scalar, fixed quantities and V
n is i.i.d.
Gaussian with variance PV , then Theorem 3.1 becomes:
Theorem 3.2 (Gaussian case) A private, continuous alphabet quantization/
fingerprinting code (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) satisfies requirements (3.2) and (3.3), if and
only if (RQ, RF ) ∈ Rgauss, FD , where
Rgauss, FD =
{









































where PW (γ) was defined in (2.6), and Sl in Theorem 3.1.







































The proof of Theorem 3.2 can be found in Section 3.3.
3.1.2 A Simple Optimization of the Gaussian Collusion At-
tack
Adopting a conservative approach, and consistent with the game formulation of
Chapter 2, we can assume that the colluders know the statistics of the embedding
strategy. Namely, they know the joint distribution pIn,Ŷ n . Therefore, they might
wish to optimize the attack in terms of the parameters {λk,l}kl=1, PV , such that a
distortion constraint is satisfied. One such distortion constraint is the following:
(∀ l ≤ k) 1
n
E||Ŷ nl − Zn||2 ≤ DA (3.4)
In other words, the forgery should look similar to every fingerprinted copy in the
collusion. Such a requirement is quite reasonable, assuming that the colluders
want to be fair to each other. The ultimate goal of the attackers is to minimize
the achievable region Rgauss, FD subject to the above distortion constraint. This can
be done by minimizing


















with respect to λk
∆
= (λk,1, . . . , λk,k) and PV , such that (3.4) is satisfied.
Assuming that k and PV are fixed, we make the following observations:
1. For every l ≤ k, the region Λk,l of allowable λk such that the constraint
n−1E||Ŷ nl − Zn||2 ≤ DA is satisfied, is a convex set. Therefore, the region
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Λk = ∩kl=1Λk,l (which contains all λk that satisfy (3.4)) is convex. Hence,
for any κ1, . . . ,κm ∈ Λk, we have κ1+···+κmm ∈ Λk.
2. The set of constraints in (3.4) is symmetric with respect to the λk,l’s. There-
fore, if λk ∈ Λk, then any permutation of the elements of λk will also lie in
Λk. That is, P(λk) ∈ Λk, where P(λk) is the set that contains all distinct
permutations of λk.
3. For every m ≥ 1, the function r(λ1, . . . , λm) ∆= λ21 + · · · + λ2m is convex.
Therefore,
r(λ1, . . . , λm) ≥ r
(
λ1 + · · · + λm
m
, . . . ,




with equality if and only if λ1 = · · · = λm.
Based on the observations above, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 The value of λk which minimizes rF (γ, k,λk, PV ) subject to the
constraint (3.4), satisfies λ∗k = λ
∗
k(1, . . . , 1) for some scalar λ
∗
k.
Proof: Let us assume that λ∗k = (λ
∗
k,1, . . . , λ
∗
k,k) ∈ Λk, and let P ∗V minimize rF .
We distinguish between the following cases:












for some Sl, and coefficients λk,s = λ
∗
k for all s ∈ Sl. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can take λ∗k = λ
∗
k(1, . . . , 1).
• Suppose now that for t, s ∈ Sl (where Sl attains the minimum in (3.5)) we
have λ∗k,s = λ∗k,t. By switching the sth and tth elements of λ∗k, we obtain λ′k
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The proof of the theorem is thus concluded.
From the above, we obtain that the optimal choice (with respect to the colluders’
point of view) is λk,l = λk, ∀ l ≤ k. Then, (3.4) becomes
(k − 1)(k − 2)λ2k(γ − 1)PW (γ) + (k − 1)λ2kγPW (γ)
+ 2(k − 1)λk(λk − 1)(γ − 1)PW (γ) + (λk − 1)2γPW (γ) + PV ≤ DA (3.7)













































For computing the optimal values of λk, PV , an analysis similar to the one in



































k(γPW (γ) − DA)
(1 + (γ − 1)k)((DA − PW (γ))k + PW (γ))
)}}
where Γ(RQ, D,DA) was defined in (2.13).
Figure 3.2 shows Rgauss, FD,DA for different values of k, when PI = 150 and D =
DA = 50. We can immediately see that, as the number of colluders increases, the
rate region shrinks. Therefore, collusion can be a very effective means of attack.
Note that for k = 1, the rate region shown is the one achieved under the optimum




3.1.3 A Multi-User Costa Scheme
Thus far, all fingerprinting systems considered in this chapter operate in a private
scenario. We also present a public scenario which is analogous to Costa’s formula-
tion [15] for the multi-access case. More precisely, assume that the output of the
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RF k = 1
Figure 3.2: The rate region achieved under an optimized Gaussian attack, for
different values of k (number of colluders).
encoder is Y nl = f(Wl, I
n) = In + Xn(Wl, I
n) (without quantization) such that a
squared-error distortion constraint is met. That is,
(∀ l) n−1E||In − Y nl ||2 = n−1E||Xnl ||2 ≤ D (3.8)









The detector receives Zn and attempts to detect all W1, . . . ,Wk without any knowl-
edge of In. As it turns out, using an encoding technique similar to Costa’s in [15],









which is precisely the maximum rate achievable in Rgauss, FD when RQ = ∞. The
proof of this result can be found in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
As we saw in Section 3.1, the Wl’s are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , Jn}, but

















Pe(w1, . . . , wk)
The last expression is the average probability of error resulting by choosing the Wl’s
in an i.i.d. fashion (in which case they will not necessarily be distinct). From the
above inequality it suffices to show that this probability of error is asymptotically
vanishing.
By virtue of the above bound, we assume from now on, and in all the proofs
of this chapter, that (W1, . . . ,Wk) are independent and uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . , Jn}. Hence, given In, the random variables Ŷ nl = f(Wl, In) are independent
(since the Wl’s are independent and Ŷ
n is a function of W and In). Thus, we have
the Markov condition
(∀ l = m) Ŷ nl → In → Ŷ nm (3.9)
and therefore:
pŶ n1 ,...,Ŷ nk |In =
k∏
l=1
pŶ nl |In = (pŶ n|In)
k
where the last equality is due to the fact that all Ŷ nl ’s are outputs of the same
function f .
Converse Theorem
We first prove the following lemma, which is a variant of Fano’s inequality [33].
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Lemma 3.1 Let Ŵl ∈ {1, . . . , Jn} for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Then
H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ≤ log(k + 1) + PenRF
where Pe = Pr{(Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ∈ P(W1, . . . ,Wk)}, and P(S) is the set of all permu-
tations of an ordered set S.




1 if Ŵ1 = W1
2 if Ŵ2 = W1
...
...
k if Ŵk = W1
0 otherwise
Then, we have
H(W1, T |Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) = H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T ) + H(T |Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk)
= H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) + H(T |Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk,W1)
Observe that H(T |Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk,W1) = 0. Also, H(T |Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ≤ H(T ) ≤
log(k + 1). Hence, we have
H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ≤ H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T ) + log(k + 1) (3.10)
We now have
H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T ) =
k∑
l=0
Pr{T = l}H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T = l)
= Pr{T = 0}H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T = 0) (3.11)
≤ PenRF (3.12)
where (3.11) holds because H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk, T = l) = 0 for all l = 0. Thus,
combining (3.10) and (3.12), the lemma is proved.
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The converse theorem states that any rate pair (RQ, RF ) that satisfies constraints
(3.2) and (3.3) must lie in Rdsc, FD .
Proof: Let ε > 0. We assume that Pr{(Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) ∈ P(W1, . . . ,Wk)} < ε and





Ed(Ij, Ŷl,j) = D (3.13)
where Ŷ nl = (Ŷl,1, . . . , Ŷl,n) is the fingerprinted image of the l-th user. Since all
fingerprinted copies are generated through the same encoder f , it follows that
(∀ l) pŶ nl |In = pŶ n|In
and the Markov conditions (3.9) are satisfied.
As we saw in Section 2.2, the lower bound on RQ in the definition of Rdsc, FD can
be established using a standard argument from rate-distortion theory [33].




= n−1I(W1; Ŷ n1 |In) + n−1H(W1|Ŷ n1 , In) (3.15)
≤ n−1I(W1; Ŷ n1 |In) + n−1H(W1|Zn, In) (3.16)
≤ n−1I(W1; Ŷ n1 |In) + n−1H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk) (3.17)
≤ n−1I(W1; Ŷ n1 |In) + ε (3.18)
= n−1H(Ŷ n1 |In) − n−1H(Ŷ n1 |In,W1) + ε
= n−1H(Ŷ n1 |In) + ε (3.19)
= n−1H(Ŷ n1 ) − n−1(H(Ŷ n1 ) − H(Ŷ n1 |In)) + ε
≤ RQ − n−1I(Ŷ n1 ; In) + ε (3.20)
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= RQ − H(I) + n−1H(In|Ŷ n1 ) + ε
≤ RQ − H(I) + n−1
n∑
j=1
H(Ij|Ŷ1,j) + ε (3.21)
= RQ − n−1
n∑
j=1
I(Ij; Ŷ1,j) + ε
= RQ − n−1
n∑
j=1
I(Ij; Ŷj) + ε (3.22)
where (3.14) is true because In is independent of W1; (3.16) follows from the
Markov chain W1 → (Ŷ n1 , In) → (Zn, In); (3.17) holds because H(W1|Zn, In) =
H(W1|g(k)(Zn, In), Zn, In) ≤ H(W1|g(k)(Zn, In)) = H(W1|Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk); (3.18) fol-
lows from Lemma 3.1; (3.19) holds because Ŷ n1 is a deterministic function of
In,W1, (3.20) follows from RQ ≥ n−1H(Ŷ n1 ) and (3.21) is due to the inequali-
ties H(In|Ŷ n1 ) ≤
∑n
i=1 H(Ij|Ŷ n1 ) ≤
∑n
j=1 H(Ij|Ŷ1,j).
For l with 1 ≤ l ≤ k, we denote by Sl any subset of {1, . . . , k} such that |Sl| = l.
Let Sl = {s1, . . . , sl}. We use the following notation:
WSl
∆











= (Ŷs1,j, . . . , Ŷsl,j)
where Ŷs,j is the j-th element of Ŷ
n
s . Also, we denote S̄l = {1, . . . , k} − Sl.
For each 1 ≤ l ≤ k, and for each Sl (as defined above), we obtain the following
chain of inequalities:
lRF = n
−1H(WSl|WS̄l , In) (3.23)
= n−1I(WSl ; Z
n|WS̄l , In) + n−1H(WSl|WS̄l , In, Zn)





≤ n−1I(WSl ; Zn|WS̄l , In) + lε (3.24)
= n−1H(Zn|WS̄l , In) − n−1H(Zn|W1, . . . ,Wk, In) + lε












H(Zj|ŶS̄l,j, Ij) − n−1
n∑
j=1








I(Zj; ŶSl,j|ŶS̄l,j, Ij) + lε (3.29)
where (3.23) is due to the independence of In and W1, . . . ,Wk; (3.24) follows
from Lemma 3.1; (3.25) holds because of the Markov chains (In,W1, . . . ,Wk) →
(Ŷ n1 , . . . , Ŷ
n
k ) → Zn and (Ŷ n1 , . . . , Ŷ nk ) → (In,W1, . . . , Wk) → Zn; (3.26) follows
from the chain rule for the entropy; (3.27) holds because the attack channel is
memoryless and therefore given (Ŷ1,j, . . . , Ŷk,j), the variable Zj is conditionally
independent of everything else and (3.28) follows because conditioning reduces
entropy.
Note that (3.29) is true for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k and all Sl ⊂ {1, . . . , k}. Hence, together



















Using a similar approach as in Section 2.2, we can argue that, since I(Ij; Ŷj) and
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I(Zj; ŶSl,j|ŶS̄l,j, Ij) ≤ Ia(Z; ŶSl |ŶS̄l , I) (3.32)
where the mutual information expressions on the right-hand side of (3.31) and
(3.32) are computed with respect to the pmf pa
Ŷ |I = n
−1∑n
j=1 pŶj |Ij that was defined
in (2.35). The remainder of the proof follows in the same way as in the converse
in Section 2.2, and will be omitted.
Note: The same result can be obtained if, instead of using pa
Ŷ |I , we introduce
a time-sharing variable Q uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n} on the conditions
side of each mutual information functional. In that case, the final expression
involves maximization with respect to the joint distribution pŶ |I,Q pQ|I pI . The
rate region obtained is the same as the region Rdsc, FD described by the expression
in the statement of the theorem.
Direct Theorem
We now show that Rdsc, FD is achievable.
Proof: As usual (cf. proofs of Theorems 2.1, 2.3), we limit the quantization rate
to RQ ≥ rq(D).
We present an outline of the proof here. Many of the details are quite straight-
forward, or come directly from proofs presented elsewhere.
We assume that the indices W1, . . . ,Wk are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , Jn}.
Furthermore, we use a random coding argument and we finally establish that there
exists a deterministic code that achieves arbitrarily small probability of error.
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Codebook Generation: The codebook generation is identical to the one given in
the direct part of Theorem 2.1. A set of 2nRQ sequences Ỹ n is generated i.i.d.
according to a pmf pŶ , and then the set is partitioned uniformly into 2
nRF subsets.
Fingerprint Embedding: The embedding is again identical to the procedure de-
scribed in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Given In and a fingerprint index w, the
encoder outputs Ŷ n(w), as determined by joint typicality with respect to some
probability distribution pŶ |I which satisfies
n−1Ed(In, Ŷ n) ≤ D
Decoding: The decoder receives Zn (generated from Ŷ n(W1), . . . , Ŷ
n(Wk)). In
the sequel, we will refer to Ŷ n(Wl) as Ŷ
n
l . The decoder then seeks a k-tuple
(Ŷ n(ŵ1), . . . , Ŷ
n(ŵk)) such that (I
n, Ŷ n(ŵ1), . . . , Ŷ
n(ŵk), Z
n) belongs to a set
T n
I,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z
(ε), the set of typical k-tuples with respect to the distribution pI,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z
= pZ|Ŷ1,...,Ŷk(pŶ |I)
kpI (observe that the last equality is due to the Markov conditions
(3.9)). If a unique set of indices {ŵ1, . . . , ŵk} exists (their ordering is immaterial
here) then the decoder outputs it, otherwise it declares an error.
Probability of Error: Without loss of generality, we assume that W1 = 1, . . . ,Wk =
k. Consistent with the proof of Theorem 2.1, we again have three kinds of error
events:
(i) E1: I
n is not represented well (i.e., in terms of the distortion constraint) by at
least one of Ŷ n1 , . . . , Ŷ
n
k .
(ii) E2: Assuming E
c
1 (i.e., that E1 did not occur), (I




(iii) E3: Assuming (E1 ∪ E2)c, there exists a k-tuple (w1, . . . , wk) ∈ P(1, . . . , k)
such that (In, Ŷ n(w1), . . . , Ŷ
n(wk), Z
n) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z
(ε).
As we proved in Section 2.2, the probability of event E1 approaches zero as long
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as
RF ≤ RQ − I(I; Ŷ ) − ε (3.33)
Moreover, it can be easily proved that the probability of E2 goes to zero.
We can upper-bound the probability of the error event E3 as follows:
Pr(E3) ≤ Pr{∃ (w1, . . . , wk) = (1, . . . , k) :
(In, Ŷ n(w1), . . . , Ŷ
n(wk), Z
n) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z
(ε)} (3.34)
= Pr{(∃ Sl ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, 1 ≤ l ≤ k) ∧ (∃ (w1, . . . , wk) :
(ws = s, ∀ s ∈ Sl) ∧ (wt = t, ∀ t ∈ S̄l)) :
(In, Ŷ n(w1), . . . , Ŷ
n(wk), Z










ws =s, ∀ s∈Sl
wt=t, ∀ t∈ S̄l
1 ×
×Pr{(In, Ŷ n(w1), . . . , Ŷ n(wk), Zn) ∈ T nI,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z(ε)} (3.35)
where the right-hand side of (3.34) is clearly an upper bound on Pr(E3), since
there are fingerprint index combinations (e.g., when (w1, . . . , wk) is a permutation
of (1, . . . , k)) that do not lead to error. Also, all probabilities are computed under
the condition that Zn is the output of the channel whose input is Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(k).
Moreover, Sl and S̄l are defined similarly as in the converse part; Sl denotes any
subset of {1, . . . , k} that has l elements and S̄l = {1, . . . , k} − Sl.
Because of the symmetry of the random code and because Zn is independent
of Ŷ n(w),∀ w > k given In, a standard argument similar to the one used in the
proof of the direct part of Theorem 14.3.1 in [33], gives:
Pr{(In, Ŷ n(w1), . . . , Ŷ n(wk), Zn) ∈ T nI,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z(ε)} ≤ 2
−n(I(Z;{Ŷs}s∈Sl |{Ŷt}t∈S̄l )−o(1))
for all ws = s, wt = t with s ∈ Sl and t ∈ S̄l. Note that o(1) approaches zero with
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(2nRF )l 2−n(I(Z;{Ŷs}s∈Sl |{Ŷt}t∈S̄l )−o(1)) (3.36)
Hence, (3.36) approaches zero as n goes to infinity provided
(∀ 1 ≤ l ≤ k) (∀ Sl ⊂ {1, . . . , k}) RF ≤ 1
l








I(Z; {Ŷs}s∈Sl |{Ŷt}t∈S̄l) − o(1) (3.37)
Finally, we combine (3.33) with (3.37) and maximizing with respect to all pŶ |I
such that Ed(I, Ŷ ) ≤ D, we obtain the achivability of Rdsc, FD . The existence of a
deterministic code can be proved using a standard expurgation argument.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Converse Theorem
We begin with the converse part, which establishes that all (2nRQ , 2nRF , n) codes
which satisfy conditions (3.2) and (3.3) have rates (RQ, RW ) ∈ Rgauss, FD .
Proof: Let ε > 0. Similarly to the converse of the discrete case (Section (3.2)),
here too we assume that the fingerprint indices W1, . . . ,Wk are independent, each
one being uniformly distributed in {1, . . . , 2nRF }, that Pe < ε, and that the distor-





E||In − Ŷ nl ||2 = D (3.38)
The lower bound on RQ is the standard rate-distortion function, and is trivially
established.
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For establishing the upper bound on RF , we need to consider the L2-space
of Section 2.3. The quantities φ, γ, PW (γ), λ0 have exactly the same meaning.
Moreover, the upper bound
RF ≤ RQ − 1
2
log(γ) (3.39)
follows from (3.22) and (2.47), so, no further discussion is needed here.
For each 1 ≤ l ≤ k and for each Sl (as defined in Section 3.2), we have from
(3.25):
lRF ≤ n−1h(Zn|ŶS̄l , In) − n−1h(Zn|Ŷ n1 , . . . , Ŷ nk ) + lε (3.40)
where we replaced the discrete entropy H(·) with the differential entropy h(·), since





n, where V n
is i.i.d. Gaussian of variance PV .






































































































































where (3.41) holds because V n is independent of all other variables; (3.42) follows
from the fact that, given In, ŶSl is independent from ŶS̄l . The Ψ used in (3.43)
is a n × n matrix; the j-th row of Ψ is denoted Ψ(j) while Ψ(j)In is the best
linear estimator of Ŷs,j given I
n, and is the same for every s (since we know that
all {Ŷ ns }ks=1 have the same statistics); (3.44) holds because conditioning reduces
entropy; (3.45) is the Gaussian entropy upper bound and (3.46) is a consequence
of Jensen’s inequality. Finally, in (3.47), we assume that ({Y̆ ns }s∈Sl , In) are jointly
zero-mean Gaussian, they have the same second moments as ({Ŷ ns }s∈Sl , In) and
they satisfy the same Markov conditions (3.9):
(∀ l = m) Y̆ nl → In → Y̆ nm (3.48)
It is easy to establish that E[(Y̆l,j − Ψ(j)In)(Y̆m,j − Ψ(j)In)] = 0 for all l = m.
Indeed,
E[(Y̆l,j − Ψ(j)In)(Y̆m,j − Ψ(j)In)]
= E[E[(Y̆l,j − Ψ(j)In)(Y̆m,j − Ψ(j)In)|In]]
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= E[E[Y̆l,j Y̆m,j|In] − Ψ(j)InE[Y̆l,j + Y̆m,j|In] + (Ψ(j)In)2]
= E[E[Y̆l,j|In]E[Y̆m,j|In] − Ψ(j)InE[Y̆l,j|In]
−Ψ(j)InE[Y̆m,j|In] + (Ψ(j)In)2] (3.49)
because E[Y̆l,j Y̆m,j|In] = E[Y̆l,j|In]E[Y̆m,j|In] from (3.48). Since ({Y̆ ns }s∈Sl , In) is
Gaussian, we have that E[Y̆l,j|In] = E[Y̆m,j|In] = Ψ(j)In. Substituting in (3.49),



















































where λ0 in (3.50) is as defined in Section 2.3; the inequality stems from the fact
that λ0Ij cannot be a better estimator of Y̆s,j than Ψ
(j)In, hence the mean-square-
error E[(Y̆s,j − λ0Ij)2] can only be higher; and (3.51) follows from the definition of
PW (γ).







































Proof: The proof of the direct part follows immediately from the direct part of
Theorem 2.2 (Section 2.3) and the direct part of Theorem 3.1 (Section 3.2). More
precisely: the fingerprint generation and embedding procedures are identical to
those in Section 2.3, and the fingerprint detection as well as the computation of
the probability of error follow from Section 3.2. What has to be determined is the
joint probability distribution pI,Ŷ1,...,Ŷk,Z used by the joint typicality detector. As



















(γ−1)PIPW (γ) λk,1γPW (γ)+
∑k









l =m λk,lλm,l(γ − 1)PW (γ) + PV .
Arguments similar to the ones in Section 3.2 for the existence of deterministic
codes can be given here, thus concluding the proof.
3.4 A Multi-User Costa Scheme
In this Section, we consider collusion attacks on fingerprinted images, under a
public detection scenario. Furthermore, we assume no quantization.
As usual, In is an i.i.d. Gaussian image of per-symbol variance PI . There are
2nRF fingerprint indices, each one corresponding to a particular customer. The
information hider generates 2nRF fingerprinted copies of In, say Y n(1, In), . . . ,
Y n(2nRF , In), such that the following distortion constraint is satisfied:
(∀ w) 1
n
E||In − Y n(w, In)||2 ≤ D (3.53)
85
Equivalently, we can assume that Y n(w, In) = In +Xn(w, In), and therefore (3.53)
becomes
(∀ w) n−1E||Xn(w, In)||2 ≤ D (3.54)
Let W1, . . . ,Wk be the indices of the colluders, each uniformly distributed in








where, by definition, Y nl = Y
n(Wl, I
n) and V n is i.i.d. Gaussian noise with variance
PV (per dimension). The decoder produces estimates Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk of W1, . . . ,Wk
without knowledge of In.
We use a random coding argument for our achievability proof. The approach
is the multi-user extension of Costa’s proof [15]. We trace the following steps:
Codebook Generation: First, 2nRU sequences Un are generated i.i.d. Gaussian with
variance D +α2PI per dimension. Next, these sequences are distributed uniformly
into 2nRF bins. Therefore, each bin w contains Un(w, 1), . . . , Un(w, 2n(RU−RF )).
Fingerprint Embedding: Given In and fingerprint index w, the embedder seeks
within bin w a Un(w, q) which is jointly typical with In (that is, (In, Un(w, q)) ∈
T n
I,Û









An error is declared if no such Un can be found. Otherwise, the encoder sets
Ûn(w, In) = Un(w, q) and outputs Y n = Ûn(w, In) + (1 − α)In. The selected
sequence Ûn(w, In) is also distortion-typical, in the sense that n−1E||Ûn(w, In) −
αIn||2 = n−1E||Xn(w, In)||2 ≤ D + ε.
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Decoding: The decoder, given Zn, seeks Un(ŵ1, q1), . . . , U
n(ŵk, qk) (belonging to
bins ŵ1, . . . , ŵk, respectively) such that (U





(ε). Here, T n
Û1,...,Ûk,Z
(ε) is the set of jointly typical tuples with respect











λk(D+kαPI) ··· λk(D+kαPI) λ2kk(D+kPI)+PV


If exactly k typical Un(ŵ1, q1), . . . , U
n(ŵk, qk) are found, then the decoder outputs
Ŵl = ŵl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Otherwise, an error is declared.
Probability of Error: Without loss of generality, we assume that W1 = 1, . . . ,Wk =
k (this is the worst-case scenario in which all the fingerprint indices are different).
We now have the following error events:
(i) E1: No U
n(l, q) can be found for some l ≤ k, such that (In, Un(l, q)) ∈ T n
I,Û
.
(ii) E2: Assuming E
c
1 (i.e., that all bins 1, . . . , k contain U
n’s which are typical
with In), not all bins 1, . . . , k contain Un(1, q1), . . . , U
n(k, qk) respectively, such
that (Un(1, q1), . . . , U
n(k, qk), Z
n) ∈ T n
Û1,...,Ûk,Z
.
(iii) E3: Assuming (E1 ∪ E2)c, there exists a tuple (w1, . . . , wk) ∈ P(1, . . . , k) and
there exist Un(w1, q1), . . . , U
n(wk, qk) in bins w1, . . . , wk respectively, such that
(Un(w1, q1), . . . , U
n(wk, qk), Z
n) ∈ T n
Û1,...,Ûk,Z
(ε). Note that P(1, . . . , k) is the set
that contains all ordered permutations of the tuple (1, . . . , k).
Behavior of E1: We know, from rate-distortion theory, that if the number of
elements in each bin is at least 2n(I(I;Û)+ε), then Pr{E1} → 0 as n approaches
infinity. This is equivalent to
RU − RF ≥ I(I; Û) + ε (3.55)
where the mutual information is computed with respect to the Gaussian joint
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distribution with covariance matrix KI,Û . Hence, by substitution, (3.55) becomes









Behavior of E2: To show that Pr{E2} → 0, it suffices to show that (Ûn(1, In), . . . ,
Ûn(k, In), Zn) ∈ T n
Û1,...,Ûk,Z
with probability that approaches 1. From the previous
paragraph, we know that Pr{(In, Ûn(l, In)) ∈ T n
I,Û









n(l, In) + kλk(1 − α)In + V n and V n
is independent of (In, Ûn(1, In), . . . , Ûn(k, In)), it follows easily that the empir-
ical correlations obtained from (Ûn(1, In), . . . , Ûn(k, In), Zn) are within a factor
of ε of the corresponding entries of KÛ1,...,Ûk,Z with probability approaching unity
asymptotically. Hence, typicality is established with probability that approaches
1 (therefore Pr{E2} → 0).
Behavior of E3: We upper-bound the probability of the error event E3 as follows:
Pr(E3) ≤ Pr{(∃ (w1, . . . , wk) = (1, . . . , k)) ∧ ((∀ 1 ≤ l ≤ k) ∃ Un(wl, ql)) :
(Un(w1, q1), . . . , U
n(wk, qk), Z
n) ∈ T n
Û1,...,Ûk,Z
(ε)} (3.57)
= Pr{(∃ Sl ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, 1 ≤ l ≤ k) ∧ (∃ (w1, . . . , wk) :
(ws = s, ∀ s ∈ Sl) ∧ (wt = t, ∀ t ∈ S̄l)) ∧
((∀ 1 ≤ l ≤ k) ∃ Un(wl, ql)) :
(Un(w1, q1), . . . , U
n(wk, qk), Z










ws =s, ∀ s∈Sl




×Pr{(Un(w1, q1), . . . , Un(wk, qk), Zn) ∈ T nÛ1,...,Ûk,Z(ε)} (3.58)
Assume that there exists a set WQ′(r) that contains r pairs (w′1, q
′









s) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ r. Then, because of the symmetry in the construction
of the Un’s and their symmetric contribution to Zn, we have
Pr{(Un(w1, q1), . . . , Un(wk, qk), Zn) ∈ T nÛ1,...,Ûk,Z(ε)} =




where the differential entropies are computed with respect to the joint Gaussian
with covariance matrix KÛ1,...,Ûk,Z .








ws =s, ∀ s∈Sl







































2nRU (k−r)−nRF (k−l−r) 2−n((k−r)h(Û)−h(Ûr+1,...,Ûk|Û1,...,Ûr,Z))
(3.59)
The last expression in (3.59) approaches zero if for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k and 0 ≤ r ≤ k−l
we have
RU(k − r) − RF (k − l − r) < (k − r)h(Û) − h(Ûr+1, . . . , Ûk|Û1, . . . , Ûr, Z) (3.60)
Observe that when k = 1 (no collusion) then (3.60) becomes RU < I(Û ; Z), as
expected from [15].
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It can be proved by induction that













D2λ2k(k − r) + rα2PIPV + D(λ2kkPI(k + rα2 − 2rα) + PV )
kα2PIPV + D(k2λ2kPI(1 − α)2 + PV )
)

















2(k − r) log
(
D2λ2k(k − r) + rα2PIPV + D(λ2kkPI(k + rα2 − 2rα) + PV )
kα2PIPV + D(k2λ2kPI(1 − α)2 + PV )
)
(3.61)





D2λ2k(k − r) + rα2PIPV + D(λ2kkPI(k + rα2 − 2rα) + PV )
kα2PIPV + D(k2λ2kPI(1 − α)2 + PV )
)
(3.62)
It is easy to check that the right-hand side of (3.62) is maximized when α =
Dkλ2k
Dkλ2k+PV

























which is the required result. Observe that RF cannot be higher because this is




General Gaussian Images and Attacks
All results obtained so far are based on two main assumptions: that the attacks
are memoryless, and the original image In is i.i.d. In this chapter, we consider
again the problem of quantization of watermarked data, but under the following
assumptions: (i) the attack noise is additive and Gaussian but not necessarily
i.i.d. (or even stationary), and (ii) the original image In is Gaussian, but not
necessarily stationary, either. We derive achievable quantization and watermarking
rates whose values depend on the image size n. Although these rates may not have
a limit as n → ∞ (like it happens in the i.i.d. case), probabilities of error do
approach zero for very large n.
In our analysis, we use the theory developed in [18, 43, 44]. The problem that
was studied in [18, 43] is the “colored” paper version of [15]. Specifically, the
authors consider a single block of n transmissions, in which the received signal is
given by
Y n = Xn + Sn + Zn
where Xn is the transmitted signal and Zn, Sn are independent Gaussian processes
with arbitrary finite-dimensional covariance matrices (thus are not necessarily sta-
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tionary or ergodic). Sn (which plays the role of the “colored” paper) is available
non-causally to the transmitter only. Moreover, the transmission is power limited





E(X2j ) ≤ P
The main result of [18, 43] is that there exists a (en(Cn−4ε), n) code over a one-
shot use of n transmissions such that the probability of error is upper bounded
by e−nα(ε), where α(ε) does not depend on the statistics of Zn. Cn is called the
capacity of the Gaussian channel over one shot of n transmissions, and is given by
Cn = max




( |KXn + KZn|
|KZn|
)
where KXn , KZn are the covariance matrices of X
n and Zn, respectively, the max-
imum is attained for a non-singular KXn , and ε is an arbitrary positive number.
Although Cn may fluctuate arbitrarily with n, the probability of error approaches
zero for large n, as long as the rate of the code is upper-bounded by Cn.
In this chapter, we consider a private watermarking scheme, where the wa-
termarked image is distributed in quantized form. In Section 4.1, we give an
overview of the general Gaussian watermarking/quantization model and we state
the main result, i.e., the theorem which establishes the region of achievable rate
pairs (RQ, RW ). Section 4.2 contains the proof of the main theorem; finally, in
Section 4.3 we consider special cases of the general result.
4.1 Main Result
We consider a system similar to the one shown in Figure 2.2. We assume that the
watermark index W is uniformly distributed over a set of size 2nR
(n)
W ; the original
image In is zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix KIn , and the additive noise
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W depends on n. The output of the encoder is a sequence Ŷ
n which
belongs to a source codebook of size 2nR
(n)
Q (again, note the dependence of R
(n)
Q
on n). The output of the attack is Zn = BAŶ
n + V n, where BA is a fixed n × n
matrix. For each n, both encoder and decoder know BA and the statistics of the
noise, i.e., KV n . For simplicity of notation, we will drop the superscript n when we
refer to the correlation matrices; for example, KI denotes KIn . Moreover, KIŶ is
the cross-correlation matrix E[In(Ŷ n)t], where the superscript t denotes the matrix
transpose.
The definitions of a private quantization/watermarking code are similar to
those in Section 2.1, except that the rates (RQ, RW ) are no longer constant in




W ) is achievable over one shot of n









E[(Ij − Ŷj)2] ≤ D (4.1)
and













is the average probability of error, assuming that the watermark indices are uni-
formly distributed in {1, . . . , 2nR(n)W }.
We now state the main result of this chapter:
93






















, where ξ satisfies
n∑
j=1























|BA(KŶ − KŶ IK−1I KtŶ I)BtA + KV |
|KV |
)}}
where σ21, . . . , σ
2
n are the eigenvalues of I
n. If the maximum in the above expres-





W , n) quantization/watermarking codes with (R
(n)
Q − ε, R(n)W + ε) ∈









W ) ∈ Rgeneral, gaussD violates either
conditions (4.1) or (4.2).
The proof of this theorem can be found in Section 4.2.
Note: Assuming that the matrices BA and KV are non-singular, we can write the

















(Θ(KŶ − KŶ IK−1I KtŶ I)Θt)jj + ∆jj
∆jj
)






t = Θ∆Θt, ΘΘt = I
(whitening transformation). The right-hand side of the inequality becomes tight
only when Θ(KŶ −KŶ IK−1I KtŶ I)Θt is diagonal (cf. the argument for the capacity
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of an additive colored Gaussian noise channel in [33]). However, this does not
necessarily give a tight upper bound for R
(n)
W , because the first upper bound
R
(n)






|KI − KIŶ K−1Ŷ KtIŶ |
)
may become suboptimally small.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Before we proceed with the proof, it is useful to consider some important definitions
and lemmas.
The first lemma proves the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) for arbi-
trary Gaussian stochastic processes. Note that, in general, the AEP holds only for
stationary and ergodic processes [33]; that is, if {Xj} is a stationary and ergodic
process with entropy rate h, then
− 1
n
log p(X1, . . . , Xn) → h




H(Xn|Xn−1, . . . , X1) = lim
n→∞
H(X1, . . . , Xn)
n
However, Gaussian processes are special because they obey the AEP without any
assumption on stationarity or ergodicity. Although the entropy rate may not exist,




h(X1, . . . , Xn)
n
We thus have the following lemma (proved in [44]):
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Lemma 4.1 If {Xj} is an arbitrary Gaussian stochastic process, then
− 1
n
log p(X1, . . . , Xn) − hn(X) → 0
with probability one.
Note that if the Gaussian {Xj} has an entropy rate h, then the above lemma implies
that − 1
n
log p(X1, . . . , Xn) → h, as expected. In proving Lemma 4.1, it is argued
in [44] that (Xn)tK−1XnX
n has a chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom,




j , where Zj are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, 1). By
utilizing the Chernoff bound, it is then proved that, if |KXn| > 0 for all n (where
KXn is the covariance matrix of (X1, . . . , Xn)),
Pr





, for all ε > 0 (4.3)
where ε′ = ε − 1/2 log(1 + 2ε) is a positive quantity which approaches zero as ε
approaches zero. Hence, the rate of the convergence depends only on ε, and not
on |KXn|.
We now provide the following definitions, consistent with [44, 43].




h(Xn), hn(Y ) =
1
n




Then, the set T nX,Y (ε) of jointly ε-typical (X
n, Y n) is defined by
T nX,Y (ε) =
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Rn × Rn :
∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(xn) − hn(X)
∣∣∣∣ < ε∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(yn) − hn(Y )
∣∣∣∣ < ε∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(xn, yn) − hn(X,Y )
∣∣∣∣ < ε
}
where p(xn), p(yn) are the marginals of Xn, Y n respectively.
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From the definition above and Lemma 4.1, it is trivial to prove the following:
Lemma 4.2 Let Xn be an arbitrary Gaussian stochastic process, with |KXn| > 0.
Then,
Pr{Xn ∈ T nX(ε)} > 1 − ε
for n sufficiently large.
We now have the following Lemma, proved in [43].
Lemma 4.3 Let Xn, Y n be jointly Gaussian. The volume of the typical set T nX,Y (ε),
denoted by |T nX,Y (ε)|, satisfies:
(1 − 2−nε′)2n(hn(X,Y )−ε) ≤ |T nX,Y (ε)| ≤ 2n(hn(X,Y )+ε) (4.4)
Also, let Un and V n be two independent Gaussian sequences with the same marginals
as Xn and Y n respectively. Then
(1 − 2−nε′)2−n(In(X;Y )−3ε) ≤ Pr{(Un, V n) ∈ T nX,Y (ε)} ≤ 2−n(In(X;Y )+3ε) (4.5)




The proof of Lemma 4.3 is very similar to the proof of the corresponding result for
i.i.d. sources, found in [33]. Moreover, we have two more lemmas:
Lemma 4.4 For all (xn, yn) ∈ T nX,Y (ε)
pY n(y
n) ≥ pY n|Xn(yn|xn) 2−n(In(X;Y )+3ε)
where the distributions pY n , pY n|Xn are the ones used in the definition of T nX,Y (ε).
Lemma 4.5 For 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1, n > 0,
(1 − xy)n ≤ 1 − x + e−yn.
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The proof of Lemma 4.4 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 13.5.2 in [33], and
Lemma 4.5 is identical to Lemma 13.5.3 in [33].
We will now begin the proof of Theorem 4.1, starting with the converse part.
Converse Theorem
Proof: Let ε > 0. We assume that the watermark index W is uniformly dis-
tributed in {1, . . . , 2nR(n)W }, that Pr{W = Ŵ} < ε, and that the distortion con-





E[(Ij − Ŷj)2] = D (4.6)
which is equivalent to
1
n
tr(KI + KŶ − 2KIŶ ) = D
Without loss of generality, we assume that KI is non-singular, therefore, |KI | > 0
(if not, we can linearly transform In into a vector of lower dimension which has a
non-singular covariance matrix.)
First, we will derive the lower bound for R
(n)
Q . The derivation is similar to the case
of parallel Gaussian sources [33]:
R
(n)
Q ≥ n−1H(Ŷ n)
≥ n−1(H(Ŷ n) − H(Ŷ n|In))
= n−1I(Ŷ n; In)
= n−1(h(In) − h(In|Ŷ n))
= n−1(h(In) − h(In − Ŷ n|Ŷ n))
≥ n−1(h(In) − h(In − Ŷ n)) (4.7)

















































where (4.7) is true because conditioning reduces entropy; Ĩn in (4.8) is the Karhunen-
Loève transformation (KLT) of In, i.e.,
Ĩn = QtIn, s.t. QQt = I
(I = diag(1, . . . , 1)) with KĨ = Q
tKIQ and hence h(Ĩ
n) = h(In); σ21, . . . , σ
2
n in
(4.9) are the eigenvalues of KI ; and, finally, we used the Gaussian upper bound on
the entropy in (4.10), where Dj
∆
= E[(Ij − Ŷj)2].







This can be done using Lagrange multipliers and the reverse “water-filling” method




ξ, if ξ < σ2j
σj, if ξ ≥ σ2j
where ξ is chosen such that
∑n




We now establish the first upper bound on R
(n)
W . By following the same chain
of inequalities as in the converse in Section 2.2, we obtain from (2.22):
R
(n)
W ≤ R(n)Q − n−1I(Ŷ n; In) + ε (4.12)
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We have
I(Ŷ n; In) = h(In) − h(In|Ŷ n)
= h(In) − h(In − MŶ n|Ŷ n) (4.13)
≥ h(In) − h(In − MŶ n) (4.14)
≥ 1
2











where (4.13) is true for any arbitrary n×n matrix M ; (4.14) holds because condi-
tioning reduces entropy; and the Gaussian upper bound on the entropy was used
in (4.15).
We can now set M = KIŶ K
−1
Ŷ
. Then (see, for example, [45]) MŶ n is the
MMSE linear estimator of In given Ŷ n. The covariance matrix of the error is
KI−MŶ = KI − KIŶ K−1Ŷ KtIŶ , so, by substitution in (4.16) and together with
(4.12), we finally obtain:
R
(n)






|KI − KIŶ K−1Ŷ KtIŶ |
)
+ ε (4.17)








= n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + n−1H(W |In, Zn)
≤ n−1I(W ; Zn|In) + ε (4.18)
= n−1h(Zn|In) − n−1h(Zn|W, In) + ε
= n−1h(BA(Ŷ n − ΛIn) + V n|In) − n−1h(V n) + ε (4.19)




log(2πe)n(|BAKŶ −ΛIBtA + KV |) −
1
2n









where (4.18) is a consequence of Fano’s inequality; (4.19) is true for any n × n
matrix Λ; conditioning reduces entropy in (4.20); and we used the Gaussian upper
bound on the entopy of BA(Ŷ
n − ΛIn) + V n in (4.21).
By setting Λ = KŶ IK
−1













Hence, combining (4.17) and (4.23) and maximizing with respect to KIŶ and KŶ
such that (4.6) is satisfied, we obtain the required result (letting ε → 0, as usual).
We now proceed with the proof of the direct part.
Direct Theorem
Proof: We use a random coding argument. Let ε > 0 and let W be uniformly dis-
tributed in {1, . . . , 2nR(n)W }. As required for Rgeneral, gaussD , we limit the quantization
rate to R
(n)


















min{ξ, σ2j} ≤ nD
The encoding/decoding and analysis of the probability of error follow. Notice the
similarities with the achievability proof of Section 2.2.
Codebook Generation: A set of 2nR
(n)
Q sequences Ỹ n is generated, such that each
sequence is generated independently of every other sequence, according to the joint
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Gaussian N (0, KŶ ), for some non-singular matrix KŶ . The set is then partitioned
into 2nR
(n)
W subsets of 2nR
(n)








The wth subset, consisting of sequences Ỹ n(w, 1), . . . , Ỹ n(w, 2nR
(n)
1 ), becomes the
codebook for the wth watermark.
Watermark Embedding: Given In and a deterministic w, the embedder iden-
tifies within the wth codebook the first codeword Ỹ n(w, q) such that the pair
(In, Ỹ n(w, q)) lies in the set T n
I,Ŷ
(ε) of typical pairs with respect to a joint Gaussian







for covariance matrices KIŶ , KŶ such that the distortion constraint (4.6) is sat-
isfied. The output of the embedder (encoder) is denoted by Ŷ n(w) = Ỹ n(w, q).
If none of the codewords in the wth codebook is jointly typical with In, then the
embedder outputs Ŷ n(w) = 0. This way, 2nR
(n)
W watermarked versions of the image
In can be obtained: Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(2nR
(n)
W ). For random W , the embedder output
is Ŷ n(W ).
Decoding: The decoder has access to the original image In, and together with Zn,
it seeks among all watermarked versions Ŷ n(1), . . . , Ŷ n(2nR
(n)
W ) of In a single Ŷ n(ŵ)
such that the triplet (In, Ŷ n(ŵ), Zn) lies in T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε), the set of typical triplets with




KI KIŶ KIŶ B
t
A
KŶ I KŶ KŶ B
t
A






If a unique such sequence Ŷ n(ŵ) exists, then the decoder outputs Ŵ = ŵ; other-
wise, the decoder declares an error.
Error Events: Without loss of generality, we assume W = 1. Similarly to the proof
in Section 2.2, we have the following error events:




• E2: There exists a Ỹ n(1, q) = Ŷ n(1) such that (In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ T nI,Ŷ (ε), but
(In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε).
• E3: (In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) ∈ T nI,Ŷ ,Z(ε) but there also exists a k > 1 such that
(In, Ŷ n(k), Zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε).
The probability of error is then
Pr{Ŵ = 1} = Pr(E1) + Pr(E2) + Pr(E3)
Behavior of Pr(E1): We prove that, if the rate of the size of each codebook (i.e.,
R
(n)
1 ) is at least equal to to In(I; Ŷ )+ε (as defined in Lemma 4.3), then Pr(E1) → 0
as n → ∞. The proof is similar to the achievability proof of the rate-distortion
theorem for i.i.d. sources in [33]. It proceeds as follows:
Pr(E1) =
Pr{(In, Ỹ n(1, 1)) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ















(in, Ỹ n(1, q)) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε)

























 din + ε (4.24)
=
∫
in: in∈T nI (ε)
pIn(i




1 din + ε (4.25)
=
∫












din + ε (4.26)
≤
∫













din + ε (4.27)
≤
∫






















n, ŷn) dindŷn + e−2
n(R
(n)
1 −In(Ŷ ;I)−3ε) + ε




1 −In(Ŷ ;I)−3ε) + ε
≤ e−2n(R
(n)
1 −In(Ŷ ;I)−3ε) + 2ε (4.29)
where (4.24) holds because Ỹ n(1, q) is independent of In for all q and the second
integral in the preceding expression is equal to Pr{In ∈ T nI (ε)} which is less than
ε (by Lemma 4.2). Also, (4.25) is true because all Ỹ n(1, q) are independently
generated for all q. The distribution pŶ n was used in the inner integral of (4.26),
since it is equal to pỸ n by construction. Also, Lemma 4.4 was used in (4.27), Lemma
4.5 was used in (4.28), and (4.29) follows because Pr{(In, Ŷ n) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε)} > 1 − ε
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(from Lemma 4.2).
In order for (4.29) to be made arbitrarily small, it suffices that
R
(n)




W ≤ R(n)Q − In(Ŷ ; I) − 3ε (4.30)
Thus, for arbitrarily small ε, choosing a sufficiently large n, we can have Pr(E1) <
4ε, irrespectively of the covariance matrices KI , KV , as long as (4.30) is satisfied.
Moreover, the distortion constraint (4.6) is satisfied (within ε), by virtue of the




Behavior of Pr(E2): To show that Pr(E2) → 0, it suffices to show that the triplet
(In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) lies in T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε) with probability approaching unity asymptotically.
In the previous paragraph, we showed that Pr{(In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε)} → 1. How-
ever, we cannot claim that (In, Ŷ n(1), Zn) is jointly Gaussian and thereby imme-
diately show that Pr(E2) → 0 through the use of Lemma 4.2. We observe the
following:



























We now note that the conditional distribution of Zn given In, Ŷ n(1) is equal to
the unconditional distribution of V n (which is independent of In, Ŷ n(1)). That is,
pZn|In,Ŷ n(1)(z
n|in, ŷn) = pV n(zn − BAŷn)
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On the other hand, pV n(z
n − BAŷn) = pZ̃n|In,Ŷ (zn|in, ŷ), where (In, Ŷ n, Z̃n) are
jointly Gaussian with the same covariance matrix as in the definition of T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε).
Moreover, for (in, ŷn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε), the set {zn : (in, ŷn, zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε)} is the same
as the set {zn : zn ∈ T nZ (ε) ∧ zn ∈ T nZ|Ŷ n=ŷn,In=in(ε)}. This is true because when
(in, ŷn, zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε), then pZ̃n|In,Ŷ n(z
n|in, ŷn) is approximately (within ε) equal
to 2−h(Z











n, ŷn)h(V n) (4.32)
= h(V n)
= h(V n|In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn)
= h(Zn|In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn)
where (4.32) and the remaining equalities hold because of the independence be-










zn:zn∈T nZ (ε) ∧
zn∈TZ|In=in,Ŷ n=ŷn
pZ̃n|In,Ŷ n(z








×Pr{Z̃n ∈ (T nZ (ε) ∩ T nZ|In=in,Ŷ n=ŷn(ε))|In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn} din dŷn (4.33)
Since Z̃n given (In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn) is Gaussian, Lemma 4.1 holds. Therefore, for
all (in, ŷn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε), Pr{Z̃n ∈ T n
Z|In=in,Ŷ n=ŷn(ε)|In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn} > 1 − ε. Also,
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Pr{Z̃n ∈ T nZ (ε)} > 1− ε and Pr{(In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ T nI,Ŷ (ε)} → 1. Then, it can be easily
proved that Pr{Z̃n ∈ (T nZ (ε) ∩ T nZ|In=in,Ŷ n=ŷn(ε))|In = in, Ŷ n = ŷn} > 1 − ε for all
(in, ŷn) ∈ T ′ ⊂ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε), such that Pr{(In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ T ′} > 1−ε. Hence (4.33) equals
at least (1−ε) Pr{(In, Ŷ n(1)) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε)} > (1−ε)2. Thus, Pr(E2) < 1−(1−ε)2 < ε
for sufficiently large n and for any non-singular matrices KI , KŶ , KIŶ , KV .
Behavior of Pr(E3):












W − 1) Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2), Zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε)} (4.34)
where the last equality is due to the symmetry in the random code generation.
Since Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2)) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ
(ε)} → 1 and by construction, Zn is independent of
Ŷ n(2) given In, a standard argument (cf. the proof of Theorem 8.6.1 in [33]) yields
Pr{(In, Ŷ n(2), Zn) ∈ T n
I,Ŷ ,Z
(ε)} ≤ 2−n(In(Z;Ŷ |I)−(ε/2))
where the conditional mutual information is computed with respect to the Gaussian
joint distribution defined earlier. Thus, if
R
(n)
W ≤ In(Z; Ŷ |I) − ε (4.35)
it follows that the upper bound on Pr(E3) in (4.34) vanishes asymptotically.




W ≤ min {R(n)Q − In(Ŷ ; I), In(Z; Ŷ |I)} (4.36)
Since all distributions are Gaussian in the computation of the mutual information
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quantities in (4.36), using Schur’s formula [43]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A B
C D
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |D| · |A − BD
−1C|
























Then by maximizing (4.37) with respect to non-singular KŶ , KIŶ such that the
distortion constraint (4.6) is met, we obtain the required result.
By using a standard expurgation argument, we can now show the existence of a
deterministic code which achieves Rgeneral, gaussD with vanishing probability of error.
4.3 Special Cases
In this section, we consider special cases of the general Gaussian watermarking
channel. Specifically, we find simple expressions for Rgeneral, gaussD , in the following
situations:
• Parallel Gaussian model: V n consists of independent, but not necessarily
identically distributed components. That is, the j-th element of V n is zero-
mean Gaussian with variance τ 2j . Also, we assume that I
n has independent
components, i.e., the j-th element of In is zero-mean Gaussian with variance
σ2j . Moreover, BA is a diagonal matrix, i.e., BA = diag(β1, . . . , βn).
• Blockwise independent model: In and V n are blockwise memoryless. That
is, they consist of n/L blocks of L elements each, and the joint distribution
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V respectively. Moreover, each block is independent of each






A 0 · · · 0
0 B
(L)










A is a L × L matrix.
We now analyze each special case in more detail.
4.3.1 Parallel Gaussian Model
In order to find the matrices KŶ , KIŶ that attain the maximum in the definition
of Rgeneral, gaussD , we consider the converse part of section 4.2. We will first find
upper bounds on (4.12) and (4.20), and then show that these upper bounds are
attainable by a particular selection of matrices KŶ , KIŶ .
From (4.12) and (4.14), we obtain the following (we let ε → 0 for simplicity,
and we set M to be such that MŶ n is the MMSE linear estimator of In given Ŷ n):
R
(n)








































































where (4.38) holds because the sum of the individual entropies is greater than the
entropy of the vector, and M (j) is the j-th row of the matrix M ; (4.39) is the
Gaussian upper bound to the entropy; (4.40) is true because E[(Ij − µjŶj)2] ≥
E[(Ij − M (j)Ŷ n)2] for any scalar µj (recall that M (j)Ŷ n is the MMSE linear esti-
mator of Ij given Ŷ
n), φj in (4.41) is the angle between Ij and Ŷj in the L2 space
of second moments (similar to Figure 2.4), and we define γj = sin
−2(φj) in (4.42).
Thus, as it can be easily verified, the upper bound (4.42) can be achieved




1, γ1, D1), . . . , γnPW (σ
2






(γ1 − 1)σ21PW (σ21, γ1, D1), . . . ,
√
(γn − 1)σ2nPW (σ2n, γn, Dn)), where Dj ∆=
E[(Ij − Ŷj)2] and
PW (σ
2





j + Dj) − 2σ2j + 2
√
σ2j (γjDj − σ2j )(γj − 1)
γ2j




maximize the second upper bound of R
(n)
W .
From (4.20), we obtain (for ε → 0 and linear MMSE matrix Λ):
R
(n)























































where (4.43) is obtained by the usual upper bound by the entropy of independent
random variables; (4.44) is the Gaussian entropy upper bound (where Λ(j) is the
j-th row of Λ); (4.45) holds because λjIj cannot be a better estimator of Ŷj (given
In) than ΛIn; and finally, (4.46) is true because we choose λj such that λjIj is the
MMSE linear estimator of Ŷj given Ij.




attain the upper bound (4.46).
Hence, Rgeneral, gaussD takes the form:





















, where ξ satisfies
n∑
j=1
min{ξ, σ2j} = nD
R
(n)



























j , γj, Dj)
τ 2j
)}}
Hence, under this memoryless attack scenario, the optimum hiding strategy is
also memoryless (but not necessarily identically distributed). A similar conclusion
(but for the case of no compression) was reached in [9] as well. Unfortunately,
the optimal values for {γj, Dj} (which attain the maximum in the definition of
Rgeneral, gauss (1)D ) are difficult to determine analytically in the general case, mainly
due to the complexity of PW (·, ·, ·). However, we were able to perform a numerical
optimization, for the following simple case:
(∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n1) σ2j = σ21, τ 2j = τ 21 , βj = β1
(∀ n1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ n) σ2j = σ22, τ 2j = τ 22 , βj = β2
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2 , β1, β2, n1. It is easy to establish that the values of {γj, Dj}
that maximize the upper bound on R
(n)
W in the definition of Rgeneral, gauss (1)D are of
the form:
(∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n1) γ∗j = γ∗1 , D∗j = D∗1,
(∀ n1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ n) γ∗j = γ∗2 , D∗j = D∗2,
due to the symmetry of the optimization equations with Lagrange multipliers.
Thus, Rgeneral, gauss (1)D becomes:
Rgeneral, gauss (1)D =
{


















































where ν = n1/n ≤ 1.
Figure 4.1 shows achievable rate regions and the optimal values of γ1, γ2, D1
(as functions of RQ), as determined from a numerical optimization. We considered
the following cases:
(a) σ21 = 4, σ
2




2 = 2, β1 = β2 = 1, D = 1, ν = 0.5.





log(3) = 0.8962 (ξ = 1). The
maximum value of RW (when RQ = ∞) is 12 log(1 + 12) = 0.2925. Note that
the values of σ21, σ
2
2 do not affect the maximum RW (since at infinite RQ, the
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Figure 4.1: The rate region and the optimal values for γ1, γ2, D1 as functions of
RQ for the two examples (a), (b) of parallel Gaussian channels.
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watermark embedding is additive and the original image can be subtracted
completely at the decoder).
(b) σ21 = 4, σ
2
2 = 3, τ
2
1 = 3.5, τ
2
2 = 2, β1 = β2 = 1, D = 1, ν = 0.5.










) = 0.2516 (as determined by optimal water-filling in a parallel
Gaussian channel with noise variances 3.5, 2 and total signal power 2).
The various “squiggles” which appear on the plots are due to numerical artifacts in
the optimization. Also, D2 can be easily determined from D1 (since D2 =
D−νD1
1−ν ).
We now observe the following:
• Both rate regions have three rate regimes: (i) Low RQ regime, in which
the maximum RW is a linear function of RQ with slope 1; the first part
of the min(·, ·) in the expression for Rgeneral, gaussD is dominant, as was also
observed in the memoryless case of Chapter 2; γ1, γ2, D1 remain constant in
this regime, taking the optimal reverse water-filling values 4, 3, 1 respectively
(i.e., the ones that minimize n−1I(In; Ŷ n)). (ii) Intermediate RQ regime,
where the upper boundary of the rate region is “curved”, corresponding
to the second part of the min(·, ·) of Rgeneral, gaussD ; in this case, γ1, γ2 both
change such that PW (σ
2
j , γj, Dj) increases until it reaches its maximum value,
Dj. (iii) High RQ regime, where γ1, γ2, D1 and the maximum RW remain
constant; their values correspond to optimum water-filling in a Gaussian
parallel channel when RQ = ∞. For case (a) these values are: D1 = 1, γ1 =
1+σ21/D1 = 5, γ2 = 1+σ
2
2/D2 = 4 and for case (b) they are: D1 = 0.25, γ1 =
17, γ2 = 2.714.
• As in the memoryless case of Chapter 2, the low and high RQ regimes have
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the same impact here as well; at low quantization rates the Gaussian noise
does not degrade the performance of the system, and at high (but finite)
quantization rates, the compression does not hinder the watermark detection.
4.3.2 Blockwise Independent Model
Various blockwise models were also considered in [7, 25, 46, 9]. Our formulation is
analogous to the one in [9]. Similarly to the previous subsection, here too we obtain






M (L,1) 0 · · · 0











Λ(L,1) 0 · · · 0





0 0 · · · Λ(L,n/L)


where M, Λ are n×n matrices and M (L,j), Λ(L,j) are L×L matrices for all 1 ≤ j ≤
n/L. Moreover, M (L,j)Ŷ (L,j) is the MMSE linear estimator of I(L,j) given Ŷ (L,j),
and Λ(L,j)I(L,j) is the MMSE linear estimator of Ŷ (L,j) given I(L,j) (the notation














































































































We observe now that both inequalities (4.49) and (4.50) are consequences of
Jensen’s inequality [33], and they can be satisfied with equality if and only if











From the above it follows that the rate region Rgeneral, gaussD becomes



















, where ξ satisfies
L∑
j=1

























































where σ21, . . . , σ
2
L are the eigenvalues of K
(L)
I .
In other words, Rgeneral, gauss (2)D has the same form as Rgeneral, gaussD , where n is
replaced by L. This is not surprising, since the blocks are independent from each





The main focus of this thesis has been the determination of the largest possible
rate regions for information-hiding systems that combine watermarking with quan-
tization. In this last chapter, we review the key issues that were involved in our
study, and we present a unifying perspective. Finally, we conclude this dissertation
with directions for future research.
Single-User Watermarking: In Chapter 2, we derived the relationship between
quantization and watermarking rates under the following assumptions: (i) the orig-
inal image is i.i.d. distributed; (ii) attacks are memoryless; (iii) average distortion
constraints are imposed on the watermarker and the attacker; and (iv) the original
image is available at the detector (private scenario). We studied the cases of dis-
crete alphabets, as well as continuous alphabets with Gaussian images and attacks
(under quadratic distortion measures). Moreover, we considered fixed attacks, as
well as optimized attacks. In the latter case, we formulated the game played be-
tween the watermarker and the attacker, and we determined the resulting rate
region. It is interesting that, in the Gaussian case, the optimal attack is equivalent
to optimal compression of a Gaussian source.
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Fingerprinting and Collusion Attacks: In Chapter 3, we studied a finger-
printing/quantization system subject to different types of collusion attacks. The
assumptions (i)-(iv) listed above were also applicable here. We demonstrated that
collusion can significantly reduce the rate region. Furthermore, for attacks involv-
ing linear combinations plus Gaussian noise and satisfying a symmetric distortion
constraint, we showed that the optimal choice for the colluders is to perform a
symmetric attack (i.e., one where all the multiplicative coefficients are the same).
Finally, in a public scenario without compression, we proved a multi-user analogue
of Costa’s result [15]: that the maximum fingerprinting rate achievable is the same
as in a private scenario.
General Gaussian Images and Attacks: In Chapter 4 we considered Gaussian
images and attacks which are not necessarily stationary or ergodic. We derived a
general formula for the rate region in a private scenario and under average quadratic
distortion constraints. Moreover, we examined two special cases; namely, the paral-
lel Gaussian model and the blockwise-independent model, and we obtained simpler
expressions for the rate region.
5.1 A Common Theme
The results that we derived in this thesis share a common structure. Specifically,
the maximum watermarking (or fingerprinting) rate achievable in a joint water-
marking/quantization system is given by the general formula:
RW = maxCŶ
min {RQ − n−1I1(CŶ ; In), n−1I2(CŶ ;A|In)} (5.1)
where I1 and I2 are mutual information quantities, In corresponds to the original
image statistics, CŶ represents the code used by the information hider and A
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represents the attack channel. The two arguments of the minimum in (5.1) lead
to the following interpretations:
• nRW ≤ nRQ − I1(CŶ ; In), or, equivalently, nRQ ≥ nRW + I1(CŶ ; In). Thus,
the number of bits needed to describe a watermarked/compressed image
(i.e., nRQ) is at least the sum of the number of bits needed to describe the
watermark index (i.e., nRW ) and the number of bits needed to describe the
original image (i.e., I1(CŶ ; In)) at some distortion level. One would expect
this to be true considering the dual aim (watermarking and compression) of
the embedding process. It is surprising that at sufficiently low quantization
rates, (i.e., where the first argument of the minimum in (5.1) may prevail), no
additional bits may be needed in order to provide immunity against attacks.
• nRW ≤ I2(CŶ ;A|In). Thus, the number of bits needed to describe the water-
mark index cannot exceed the number of bits recoverable at the output of an
attack channel A with side information In. This is consistent with viewing
the watermark set as a code for information transmission through this chan-
nel. It is surprising that for sufficiently high quantization rates (i.e., where
the second argument of the minimum in (5.1) may prevail), compression may
not affect the detectability of the watermark.
5.2 Directions for Future Research
There are a number of extensions to the problem of joint watermarking and com-
pression of images treated in this thesis. The most important ones, are as follows:
Unknown Collusion Attacks: In Chapter 3, we assumed that the collusion at-
tack channel is fixed and known to the decoder. As a consequence, the information
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hider knows the number of colluders. Such an assumption is not always justified; in
practical situations, the decoder needs to estimate the number of colluders and the
attack channel. There exist various channel estimation techniques [36] for single-
user channels, based on training sequences. It would be interesting to obtain such
techniques for multi-user channels, as well.
The Public Scenario: All results derived in this dissertation (except the achiev-
able rates of public QIM of Chapter 2 and the multi-user Costa scheme of Chapter
3) assume a private scenario. We were not able to establish the region of achievable
rates in a public scenario, even for the simple Gaussian case of Chapter 2. Such
a region should be a subset of the region obtained in the private case; however,
whether or not it is a proper subset is still an open problem. Note that in the case
of no attacks, it was shown in [8] that public and private scenarios yield the same
rate region.
Other Types of Distortion Constraints: It would be interesting to estab-
lish rate regions for joint watermarking and compression systems under distortion
constraints that do not involve averaging of distortion measures. For example, mo-
tivated by the work in [24] and [27] respectively, two possible types of distortion
constraints could be: (i) in the almost sure sense, i.e., the distortion between two
vectors, does not exceed a threshold with probability one; and (ii) in the large-
deviations sense, where the probability that the distortion between two vectors
exceeds a threshold is upper-bounded by an exponentially-decaying function of n.
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